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Abstract: In this paper we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum
stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by a system of coupled backward
stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem for
Nash equilibrium payoffs. For this end the problem is described equivalently by a stochastic differential
game with jumps. But, however, unlike the work by Buckdahn, Hu and Li [8], here the important tool
of a dynamic programming principle for stopping times has to be developed. Moreover, we prove that
the lower and upper value functions are the viscosity solutions of the associated coupled systems of
PDEs of Isaacs type, respectively. Our results generalize those by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer
[6] and by Lin [14].
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games (SDGs, for short) with jumps and coupled nonlinear cost functionals. Since the
pioneering paper of Fleming and Souganidis [10], SDGs have been studied by many authors. For
instance, recently, Buckdahn and Li [9] investigated zero-sum two-player SDGs with nonlinear cost
functionals using a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short) approach. Unlike
Fleming and Souganidis [10] they allow the controls to depend on the past and prove with a Girsanov
transformation argument that the priori random value functions are deterministic. Buckdahn, Hu
and Li [8] extended the approach developed in [9] to SDGs with jumps, while Biswas [4] investigated
two-player zero-sum SDGs with jump diffusion in the framework of Fleming and Souganidis [10]. The
reader interested in other approaches can be also referred to Hamade`ne [11] and the references therein.
In nonzero-sum SDGs, Hamade`ne, Lepeltier and Peng [12] obtained the existence of a Nash
equilibrium point for nonzero sum SDGs with the help of BSDEs. Bessoussan and Frehse [3] obtained
Nash equilibrium payoffs for SDGs by using parabolic partial differential equations. But both methods
rely heavily on the assumption of the non degeneracy diffusion of the coefficient and it is independent
of controls. Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6] got rid of the strong assumptions on the diffusion
coefficient. Lin [14] generalizes the result in [6] by investigating Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-
sum SDGs with nonlinear cost functionals. Lasry and Lions [13] studied mean field games, i.e.,
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stochastic control of many agent systems where agents are coupled via their costs. Motivated by
the above results, we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for SDGs with coupled nonlinear cost
functionals, i.e., the both players do not only influence mutually their cost functionals in the choice of
their control processes, but also their gain processes.
In [14], the cost functionals of the both players are defined by a system of decoupled BSDEs, the
both players influence mutually their cost functionals only by the choice of their control processes. An
open problem was that how to study SDGs whose cost functionals are defined by two coupled BSDEs,
i.e, SDGs with coupled nonlinear cost functionals. This is the objective of the paper.
Let us be more precise now: The dynamics of our two-player nonzero-sum SDG is given by the
process N t,i and the following doubly controlled stochastic system:{
dX
t,x;u,v
s = b(s,X
t,x;u,v
s , us, vs)ds+ σ(s,X
t,x;u,v
s , us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],
X
t,x;u,v
t = x,
where {Bt}t≥0 is a d-dimensional standard Wiener process, {Nt}t≥0 is a Poisson process independent
of {Bt}t≥0, and F is the filtration generated by B and N . For 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, 2, we let
N
t,i
s = m(i + Ns − Nt), where m(j) = 1, if j is odd, and m(j) = 2, if j is even. The control
u = {u}s∈[t,T ] (resp., v = {v}s∈[t,T ]) is supposed to be F-predictable and takes its values in a compact
metric space U (resp., V ). The set of these controls is denoted by Ut,T (resp., Vt,T ). We shall give its
assumptions on b and σ in the next section.
We define our nonlinear cost functionals by introducing a system of two coupled BSDEs:
−d 1Y˜s = f˜1(s,Xt,x;u,vs , 1Y˜s, 2Y˜s + 2H˜s, 1Z˜s, us, vs)ds − 1Z˜sdBs − 1H˜sdNs,
−d 2Y˜s = f˜2(s,Xt,x;u,vs , 1Y˜s + 1H˜s, 2Y˜s, 2Z˜s, us, vs)ds − 2Z˜sdBs − 2H˜sdNs,
1Y˜T = Φ1(X
t,x;u,v
T ),
2Y˜T = Φ2(X
t,x;u,v
T ), s ∈ [t, T ].
(1.1)
The assumptions on Φi and f˜i, i = 1, 2, will be given in the next section. The cost functional for the
ith player, i = 1, 2, is defined by
Ji(t, x;u, v) :=
iY˜
t,x;u,v
t , (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
where ( iY˜ t,x;u,v, iZ˜t,x;u,v, iH˜t,x;u,v), i = 1, 2, is the unique solution of (1.1). Note the special form
of f˜1 and f˜2, which is related with our approach. The general case of f˜i not depending on
iH˜ is still
open.
In our framework, in opposite to zero-sum SDGs, nonzero-sum SDGs are of the type of ”NAD
strategy against NAD strategy”: an NAD strategy is a measurable, nonanticipative mapping α :
Vt,T → Ut,T for the 1th player (resp., β : Ut,T → Vt,T for the 2nd player) and has a delay (The
definition will be introduced in next section). The set of all such NAD strategies for the 1th player is
denoted by At,T (resp., for the 2nd player Bt,T ).
For (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T , there exists a unique couple of controls (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that
(α(v), β(u)) = (u, v). This allows to define Ji(t, x;α, β) := Ji(t, x;u, v), as well as the value functions
of the two-player zero-sum SDG associated with Ji, i = 1, 2, the lower value function
Wi(t, x) := esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
Ji(t, x;α, β),
and the upper value function
Ui(t, x) := essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
Ji(t, x;α, β), i = 1, 2.
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We note that, since the BSDEs (1.1) are coupled, the values of the two-player zero-sum SDGs are also
coupled.
In our approach we need a probabilistic interpretation of coupled systems of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman-Isaacs equations: A first result of our paper is that the value functions U = (U1, U2) and
W = (W1,W2) are viscosity solutions of the following coupled Isaacs equations:{
∂
∂t
Ui(t, x) +H
+
i (t, x, U1(t, x), U2(t, x),DUi(t, x),D
2Ui(t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn,
Ui(T, x) = Φi(x), i = 1, 2,
and{
∂
∂t
Wi(t, x) +H
−
i (t, x,W1(t, x),W2(t, x),DWi(t, x),D
2Wi(t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn,
Wi(T, x) = Φi(x), i = 1, 2,
respectively, where, for (t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × R× R× Rd × Sd × U × V ,
Hi(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v) =
1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pb(t, x, u, v) + f˜i(t, x, y1, y2, pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v),
and
H−i (t, x, y1, y2, p, A) = sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
Hi(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v),
H+i (t, x, y1, y2, p, A) = inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
Hi(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v).
A crucial step in the proof of these results is to obtain dynamic programming principles for stopping
times: i.e., for any stopping time τ with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ T, x ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2,
Wi(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,τ
essinf
β∈Bt,τ
iG
t,x;α,β
t,τ [WNt,iτ (τ,X
t,x;α,β
τ )],
Ui(t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt,τ
esssup
α∈At,τ
iG
t,x;α,β
t,τ [UNt,iτ (τ,X
t,x;α,β
τ )],
where iGt,x;α,βt,τ [·] is a backward stochastic semigroup (the precise definition as well as those of At,τ
and Bt,τ will be given later).
The most important part of the paper is dedicated to the Nash equilibrium payoffs of our games.
A couple (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is called a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x), if for any ε > 0, there
exists (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;α, βε)− ε, J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε, β) − ε, P− a.s.,
and
|E[Jj(t, x;αε, βε)]− ej | ≤ ε, j = 1, 2.
Our model has some practical backgrounds in financial markets. For example, let us consider the
following problem in a financial market. There are two companies (players) in a financial market. A
company 1 has invested money in bonds (paying dividends) of company 2, and company 2 in bonds of
company 1, where the dividends are payed in proportion with the gain of the corresponding company.
Therefore, the dynamics gain of company 1 has as one element of the running gain the dividends payed
by company 2, and company 2 has as one element of the running gain the dividends payed by company
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1. Both companies try to maximize their payoff which can be different. Since the financial market is
not so quick in reacting to the moves of both companies, both companies have to use strategies with
delays. The above described problem is a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game.
The main results of our paper concern the existence and a characterization of Nash equilibrium
payoffs for our games: We first obtain the characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs (see Theorem
5.7), and then get the existence of a Nash equilibrium payoff (see Theorem 5.10).
Let us explain what is new and which difficulties are related with. In comparison with [6] and [14],
the first difficulty was to get a dynamic programming principle for a system of two coupled BSDEs. To
overcome this difficulty, we associate with this system an auxiliary one which cost functionals coincide
with ours. This leads to the new problem: we need a dynamic programming principle for this system
not only for deterministic but also for stopping times. The method used in Buckdahn and Hu [7]
to get for control problems the dynamic programming principle for stopping times is not applicable
anymore, because in the framework of SDGs the monotonicity argument used in [7] doesn’t work
anymore. To overcome this new difficulty, we develop an argument to obtain the time continuity of
the value functions, which in return is used to obtain the dynamic programming principle for stopping
times from the the dynamic programming principle for deterministic times. Another technical difficulty
comes from the fact that we study here nonzero-sum SDGs and not zero-sum SDGs. In order to give
both players symmetric tools, they have to use ”strategies with delay against strategies with delay”
and not only ”strategies against controls” as in [9]. Finally, comparing to our previous work [14], the
presence of jump terms adds a supplementary complexity.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and recall some
basics of BSDEs with jumps, which will be needed in what follows. Section 3 introduces the set-
ting of SDGs and studies the dynamic programming principle for stopping times. Section 4 gives a
probabilistic interpretation of coupled systems of Isaacs equations. In Section 5 we investigate Nash
equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum SDGs. An existence theorem and a characterization theorem of
Nash equilibrium payoffs are established. Finally, we postpone the proof of the Theorems 3.11 and
4.2 to Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
The objective of this section is to give some preliminaries, which will be useful in what follows. Let
the underlying probability space (Ω,F ,P) be the completed product of the Wiener space (Ω1,F1,P1)
and the Poisson space (Ω2,F2,P2). As concerns the Wiener space (Ω1,F1,P1): Ω1 = C0(R;Rd) is the
set of continuous functions from R to Rd with value zero at 0, endowed with the topology generated
by the uniform convergence on compacts; F1 is the Borel σ-algebra over Ω1, completed by the Wiener
measure P1 under which the d-dimensional coordinate processes Bs(ω) = ωs, s ∈ R+, ω ∈ Ω1, and
B−s(ω) = ω(−s), s ∈ R+, ω ∈ Ω1, are two independent d-dimensional Brownian motions. We denote
by {FBs , s ≥ 0} the natural filtration generated by B and augmented by all P1-null sets, i.e.,
FBs = σ
{
Br, r ∈ (−∞, s]
}
∨ NP1 , s ≥ 0.
Let us now introduce the Poisson space (Ω2,F2,P2) as follows:
Ω2 =
{
ω2 =
∑
j≥0
δtj , {tj}j≥0 ⊂ R
}
,
F ′ = σ
{
NA : NA(ω2) = ω2(A), A ∈ B(R)
}
,
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and the Probability measure P2 can de defined over (Ω2,F ′) such that {Nt}t≥0 and {N−t}t≥0 are two
independent Poisson processes with intensity λ. Let us denote F2 by the completion of F ′ with respect
to the probability P2 and
F˙Nt = σ
{
N(−∞,s] : −∞ < s ≤ t
}
, t ≥ 0,
and FNt =
( ⋂
s>t
F˙Ns
) ∨ NP2 , t ≥ 0, augmented by the P2-null sets. Moreover, we put
Ω = Ω1 × Ω2, F = F1 ⊗F2, P = P1 ⊗ P2,
where F is completed with respect to P2, and the filtration F = {Ft}t≥0 is generated by
Ft := FB,Nt = FBt ⊗FNt , t ≥ 0, augmented by all P-null sets.
Let T > 0 be an arbitrarily fixed time horizon. We denote by N˜t = Nt − λt, for all t ≥ 0. For
any n ≥ 1, we denote by |z| the Euclidean norm of z ∈ Rn. We introduce the following spaces of
stochastic processes.
• L2(Ω,FT ,P;Rn) =
{
ξ | ξ : Ω→ Rn is an FT -measurable random variable such that
E[|ξ|2] < +∞
}
,
• S2(0, T ;R) =
{
ϕ | ϕ : Ω× [0, T ]→ R is an F-adapted ca`dla`g process such that
E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|ϕt|2] < +∞
}
,
• H2(0, T ;Rd) =
{
ϕ | ϕ : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd is an F-predictable process such that
E
∫ T
0
|ϕt|2dt < +∞
}
.
Let us consider the following BSDE with data (f, ξ):
yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
f(s, ys, zs, ks)ds −
∫ T
t
zsdBs −
∫ T
t
ksdN˜s, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.1)
Here f : Ω× [0, T ]× R× Rd × R→ R is F−predictable and satisfies the following assumptions:
(H1) (Lipschitz condition): There exists a positive constant C such that, for all (t, yi, zi, ki) ∈
[0, T ]× R× Rd × R, i = 1, 2,
|f(t, y1, z1, k1)− f(t, y2, z2, k2)| ≤ C(|y1 − y2|+ |z1 − z2|+ |k1 − k2|).
(H2) f(·, 0, 0, 0) ∈ H2(0, T ;R).
(H3) There exists a constant K > −1 such that, for all (t, y, z, k1, k2) ∈ [0, T ]× R× Rd × R2,
f(t, y, z, k1)− f(t, y, z, k2) ≥ K(k1 − k2).
We note that a Poisson process is a special case of a Poisson random measure. For this, we can
take as the compensator ν(ds, de) = λdsδ1(de), where
δ1(x) =
{
1, x = 1,
0, x 6= 1.
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We have the following existence and uniqueness theorem of BSDE (2.1). For its proof we refer the
reader to Tang and Li [18].
Lemma 2.1. Let the assumptions (H1) and (H2) hold. Then, for all ξ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R), BSDE
(2.1) has a unique solution (y, z, k) ∈ S2(0, T ;R) ×H2(0, T ;Rd)×H2(0, T ;R).
We have the following comparison theorem for solutions of BSDEs (2.1), which is proved with
the help of standard arguments (see Royer [17]).
Lemma 2.2. Let us denote by (y1, z1, k1) and (y2, z2, k2) the solutions of BSDEs with data (f1, ξ1)
and (f2, ξ2), respectively. Moreover, if ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R), and f1 and f2 satisfy the assumptions
(H1), (H2) and (H3), and the following holds
(i) ξ1 ≥ ξ2, P− a.s.,
(ii) f1(t, y2t , z
2
t , k
2
t ) ≥ f2(t, y2t , z2t , k2t ), dtdP− a.e,
then we have y1t ≥ y2t , a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ].
For some f : Ω× [0, T ]× R× Rd × R→ R satisfying (H1) and (H2), we let, for i = 1, 2,
fi(s, y
i
s, z
i
s, k
i
s) = f(s, y
i
s, z
i
s, k
i
s) + ϕi(s),
where ϕi ∈ H2(0, T ;R). If ξ1 and ξ2 are in L2(Ω,FT ,P;R), then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3. Let us denote by (y1, z1, k1) and (y2, z2, k2) the solutions of BSDE (2.1) with the data
(ξ1, f1) and (ξ2, f2), respectively. Then the following holds: for all t ∈ [0, T ],
|y1t − y2t |2 +
1
2
E[
∫ T
t
eβ(s−t)(|y1s − y2s |2 + |z1s − z2s |2)ds|Ft] +
λ
2
E[
∫ T
t
eβ(s−t)|k1s − k2s |2ds|Ft]
≤ E[eβ(T−t)|ξ1 − ξ2|2|Ft] + E[
∫ T
t
eβ(s−t)|ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)|2ds|Ft], P− a.s.
Here β ≥ 2 + 2C + 4C2, where C is the Lipschitz constant in (H1).
For the proof, the readers can be referred to Barles, Buckdahn and Pardoux [1].
3 Stochastic differential games with jumps
In this section, we first introduce nonzero-sum SDGs, and then we define the value functions and
show that they have a deterministic version. Finally, we state the dynamic programming principle for
stopping times, which is crucial for the next section.
Let U (resp., V) be the set of admissible control processes for the first (resp., second) player, i.e.,
the set of all U (resp., V )-valued F-predictable processes. We suppose that the control state spaces U
and V are compact metric spaces.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we consider the following stochastic differ-
ential equation (SDE): for t ∈ [0, T ] and ζ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,P;Rn),{
dX
t,ζ;u,v
s = b(s,X
t,ζ;u,v
s , us, vs)ds+ σ(s,X
t,ζ;u,v
s , us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],
X
t,ζ;u,v
t = ζ,
(3.1)
where
b : [0, T ] × Rn × U × V → Rn , σ : [0, T ]× Rn × U × V → Rn×d,
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satisfy the following assumptions:
(i) For every fixed x ∈ Rn, b(., x, ., .), and σ(., x, ., .) are continuous in (t, u, v).
(ii) There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, u ∈ U, v ∈ V,
|b(t, x, u, v) − b(t, x′, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v) − σ(t, x′, u, v)| ≤ C|x− x′|.
(H4)
From (H4) we know that there exists some C > 0 such that, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T, u ∈ U, v ∈ V, x ∈ Rn,
|b(t, x, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v)| ≤ C(1 + |x|).
It is well known that under (H4), for any u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, SDE (3.1) has a unique strong
solution. Furthermore, we have the following estimates for the solution of SDE (3.1) (e.g., see [8]).
Proposition 3.1. Let the assumption (H4) hold. Then, for p ≥ 2, there exists a positive constant
C = Cp such that, for t ∈ [0, T ], u(·) ∈ U , v(·) ∈ V and ζ, ζ ′ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,P;Rn),
E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Xt,ζ;u,vs −Xt,ζ
′;u,v
s |p|Ft] ≤ C|ζ − ζ ′|p, P− a.s.,
E[ sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Xt,ζ;u,vs − ζ|p|Ft] ≤ C(1 + |ζ|p)|T − t|
p
2 , P− a.s. (3.2)
For given Φi : R
n → R, f˜i : [0, T ]×Rn×R2×Rd×U × V → R, i = 1, 2, we make the following
assumptions:
(i) For every fixed (x, y, z) ∈ Rn × R2 × Rd × R, f˜i(., x, y, z, ., .) is continuous in
(t, u, v) and there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn,
y, y′ ∈ R2, z, z′ ∈ Rd, u ∈ U and v ∈ V,
|f˜i(t, x, y, z, u, v) − f˜i(t, x′, y′, z′, u, v)| ≤ C(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ |z − z′|).
(ii) For all (y1, y2), (y
′
1, y
′
2) ∈ R2, and (t, x, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × Rd × U × V,
there exists a constant K > −1 such that
f˜1(t, x, y1, y2, z, u, v) − f˜1(t, x, y1, y′2, z, u, v) ≥ K(y2 − y′2),
f˜2(t, x, y1, y2, z, u, v) − f˜2(t, x, y′1, y2, z, u, v) ≥ K(y1 − y′1).
(iii) There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all x, x′ ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2,
|Φi(x)− Φi(x′)| ≤ C|x− x′|.
(H5)
The following system of two coupled BSDEs will define the cost functionals of the game associated
with (3.1). 
−d 1Y˜s = f˜1(s,Xt,x;u,vs , 1Y˜s, 2Y˜s + 2H˜s, 1Z˜s, us, vs)ds
−λ 1H˜sds− 1Z˜sdBs − 1H˜sdN˜s,
−d 2Y˜s = f˜2(s,Xt,x;u,vs , 1Y˜s + 1H˜s, 2Y˜s, 2Z˜s, us, vs)ds
−λ 2H˜sds− 2Z˜sdBs − 2H˜sdN˜s,
1Y˜T = Φ1(X
t,x;u,v
T ),
2Y˜T = Φ2(X
t,x;u,v
T ), s ∈ [t, T ],
(3.3)
where Xt,x;u,v is the solution of equation (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ Rn. Under the assumption (H5), from
Tang and Li [18] we know that equation (3.3) has a unique solution. For given control processes
u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we introduce now the associated cost functional for the ith player, i = 1, 2,
Ji(t, x;u, v) :=
iY˜
t,x;u,v
t , (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
where ( iY˜ t,x;u,v, iZ˜t,x;u,v, iH˜t,x;u,v) is the solution of (3.3).
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In the above definition we generalize the framework studied by Lin [14]. Indeed, in [14] we
studied cost functionals defined by a decoupled system of BSDEs, while now the both BSDEs are
coupled: the both players do not only influence mutually their cost functionals in the choice of their
control processes, but also their gain processes iY˜ t,x;u,v, i = 1, 2. With an argument introduced in
Pardoux, Pradeilles and Rao [15] we can transfer the coupled system of BSDEs into a decoupled
system of BSDEs. For 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, 2, we denote by N((0, s]) := Ns and N((t, s]) := Ns −Nt.
Let us define a Markov process N t,is as follows: N
t,i
s = m(i + N((t, s])), where m(j) = 1, if j is odd,
and m(j) = 2, if j is even.
For (t, x, y, h, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R× R× Rd × U × V , we define
f1(t, x, y, h, z, u, v) := f˜1(t, x, y, y + h, z, u, v),
f2(t, x, y, h, z, u, v) := f˜2(t, x, y + h, y, z, u, v),
and we consider the following controlled decoupled BSDEs with jumps: for i = 1, 2,
−d iY t,x;u,vs = fNt,is (s,X
t,x;u,v
s ,
iY
t,x;u,v
s ,
iH
t,x;u,v
s ,
iZ
t,x;u,v
s , us, vs)ds,
−λ iHt,x;u,vs ds− iZt,x;u,vs dBs − iHt,x;u,vs dN˜s, s ∈ [t, T ],
iY
t,x;u,v
T = ΦNt,iT
(Xt,x;u,vT ).
(3.4)
Since f˜i, i = 1, 2, are Lipschitz in (x, y, z), uniformly with respect to (t, u, v), it is easy to check
that also the coefficients fi, i = 1, 2, have this property. From Lemma 2.1 we know that the above
BSDE has a unique solution. In what follows we choose the intensity λ > 0 such that K − λ > −1.
It follows from Lemma 2.2 that the comparison theorem for the BSDE (3.4) holds. Moreover, we also
have the following propositions.
Proposition 3.2. Let the assumption (H5) hold. Then we have, for s ∈ [t, T ], i = 1, 2,
iY t,x;u,vs =
N
t,i
s Y˜ t,x;u,vs ,
iHt,x;u,vs =
m(Nt,is−+1)H˜t,x;u,vs +
m(Nt,is−+1)Y˜
t,x;u,v
s− − N
t,i
s− Y˜
t,x;u,v
s− .
In particular, we have iY t,x;u,vt =
iY˜
t,x;u,v
t , i.e., Ji(t, x;u, v) =
iY
t,x;u,v
t .
Proof. We consider the solution (iY˜ t,x;u,v, iZ˜t,x;u,v, iH˜t,x;u,v), i = 1, 2, of equation (3.3) and, suppress-
ing for simplicity the superscript (t, x, u, v), we put
iYˆs =
N
t,i
s Y˜s,
iZˆs =
N
t,i
s Z˜s,
iHˆs =
m(Nt,is−+1)H˜s +
m(Nt,is−+1)Y˜s− − N
t,i
s− Y˜s−, s ∈ [t, T ].
Then, obviously, (iYˆ , iZˆ, iHˆ) ∈ S2(0, T ;R) × H2(0, T ;Rd) × H2(0, T ;R). Moreover, setting τ0 = t
and
τl = inf
{
s ≥ t,N((t, s]) = l
}
∧ T, l ≥ 1,
we have, on the stochastic interval ]]τ0, τ1[[,
−d 1Yˆs = −d 1Y˜s = f˜1(s,Xs, 1Y˜s, 2Y˜s + 2H˜s, 1Z˜s, us, vs)ds− 1Z˜sdBs
= f˜1(s,Xs,
1Y˜s, (
2Y˜s − 1Y˜s + 2H˜s) + 1Y˜s, 1Z˜s, us, vs)ds− 1Z˜sdBs
= f1(s,Xs,
1Y˜s,
2Y˜s − 1Y˜s + 2H˜s, 1Z˜s, us, vs)ds− 1Z˜sdBs
= f1(s,Xs,
1Yˆs,
1Hˆs,
1Zˆs, us, vs)ds− 1ZˆsdBs.
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On the other hand, analysing the jump hight of 1Yˆ at τ1, we get
∆ 1Yˆτ1 =
1Yˆτ1 − 1Yˆτ1− = ( 2Y˜τ1 − 1Y˜τ1−)∆Nτ1
= ( 2H˜τ1 +
2Y˜τ1− − 1Y˜τ1−)∆Nτ1 = 1Hˆτ1∆Nτ1 .
Consequently, (1Yˆ , 1Zˆ, 1Hˆ) solves (3.4) over the interval [[τ0, τ1]], with
1Yˆτ1 =
N
t,1
s Y˜τ1 . By iterating
this argument and arguing in a similar way for i = 2, we complete the proof. Indeed, from the
uniqueness of BSDE (3.4) it follows that (iY t,x;u,v, iZt,x;u,v, iHt,x;u,v) = (iYˆ , iZˆ, iHˆ), i = 1, 2.
From standard BSDEs estimates we have the following:
Proposition 3.3. There exists some constant C > 0 such that, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x, x′ ∈ Rn, u(·) ∈
U and v(·) ∈ V,
| iY t,x;u,vt − iY t,x
′;u,v
t | ≤ C|x− x′|, | iY t,x;u,vt | ≤ C(1 + |x|), P− a.s.
Let us now introduce subspaces of admissible controls and give the definition of NAD strategies.
For later applications this has to be done for games over stochastic intervals. Let σ, τ be two stopping
times such that t ≤ σ ≤ τ ≤ T.
Definition 3.4. The space Uσ,τ (resp., Vσ,τ ) of admissible controls for the 1th player (resp., the 2nd
player) over the given stochastic time interval [[σ, τ ]] is defined as the space of all processes {ur, σ ≤
r ≤ τ} (resp., {vr, σ ≤ r ≤ τ}), such that, for u0 ∈ U , the process {ur1[σ,τ ] + u01[σ,τ ]c} (resp., for
v0 ∈ V , the process {vr1[σ,τ ] + v01[σ,τ ]c}) are F-predictable and take its values in U (resp., V ).
Definition 3.5. A nonanticipative strategy with delay (NAD strategy) for the 1th player over the
given stochastic time interval [[σ, τ ]] is a measurable mapping α : Vσ,τ → Uσ,τ such that the following
properties hold:
1) α is a nonanticipative strategy, i.e., for every F-stopping time τ ′ on Ω with σ ≤ τ ′ ≤ τ, and
for all v1, v2 ∈ Vσ,τ with v1 = v2 on [[σ, τ ′]], it holds α(v1) = α(v2) on [[σ, τ ′]]. (The identification of
v1 = v2 and α(v1) = α(v2) is in the dsdP almost everywhere sense.)
2) α is a strategy with delay, i.e., for all v ∈ Vσ,τ , there exists an increasing sequence of stopping
times {Sn(v)}n≥1 with
i) σ = S0(v) ≤ S1(v) ≤ · · · ≤ Sn(v) ≤ · · · ≤ τ , ii)
⋃
n≥1{Sn(v) = τ} = Ω, P-a.s.,
such that, for all Γ ∈ Fσ and for all n ≥ 1 and v, v′ ∈ Vσ,τ , it holds: if v = v′ on [[σ, Sn−1(v)]]
⋂
(Γ×
[t, T ]), then iii) Sl(v) = Sl(v
′), on Γ, P-a.s., 1 ≤ l ≤ n,
iv) α(v) = α(v′), on [[σ, Sn(v)]]
⋂
(Γ× [t, T ]).
We denote the collection of all such NAD strategies for the 1th player by Aσ,τ . We can define all
NAD strategies β : Uσ,τ → Vσ,τ for the 2nd player symmetrically and denote the set of them by Bσ,τ .
We have the following lemma, which turns out to be useful in what follows. Since the proof of
this lemma is similar to that in Lin [14], we omit it here.
Lemma 3.6. For (α, β) ∈ Aσ,τ × Bσ,τ , there exists a unique couple of admissible control processes
(u, v) ∈ Uσ,τ × Vσ,τ such that α(v) = u, β(u) = v.
For (α, β) ∈ At,T ×Bt,T , it follows from Lemma 3.6 that there exists a unique couple of controls
(u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v). In this sense, we define
(Xt,x;α,β, iY t,x;α,β, iZt,x;α,β, iHt,x;α,β) := (Xt,x;u,v, iY t,x;u,v, iZt,x;u,v, iHt,x;u,v),
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and Ji(t, x;α, β) := Ji(t, x;u, v). This definition allows, in particular, to define the value functions Wi
and Ui of the game: For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, we put
Wi(t, x) := esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
Ji(t, x;α, β), Ui(t, x) := essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
Ji(t, x;α, β).
The functionsWi and Ui, i = 1, 2, are called the lower and upper value functions, respectively. Observe
that, according to the definition of esssup and essinf over a uniformly essentially bounded family of
Ft-measurable random variables, both Wi(t, x) and Ui(t, x) are a priori elements of L∞(Ω,Ft,P).
However, we will prove that they are deterministic.
Proposition 3.7. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, we
have Wi(t, x) = E[Wi(t, x)], and Ui(t, x) = E[Ui(t, x)], P− a.s., i = 1, 2.
This proposition allows to identify Wi(t, x), Ui(t, x) with the deterministic functions E[Wi(t, x)],
E[Ui(t, x)], respectively, i = 1, 2. The proposition follows then by the following two lemmas. The
following lemma indicates that Wi is invariant by a sufficiently large class of transformations on Ω.
Lemma 3.8. For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, τ : Ω → Ω is an invertible F − F measurable transformation
such that
i) τ and τ−1 : Ω→ Ω are Ft −Ft measurable;
ii) (Bs −Bt) ◦ τ = Bs −Bt, s ∈ [t, T ], N((t, s]) ◦ τ = N((t, s]), s ∈ [t, T ];
iii) the law P ◦ [τ ]−1 of τ is equivalent to the underlying probability measure P,
then Wi(t, x) ◦ τ =Wi(t, x), P-a.s.
Even if the formulation of of the lemma is the same as in [8], the proof is more difficult here.
Indeed, in [8] games of the type ”strategy again control” were studied, while we investigate here games
of the type ”NAD strategy against NAD strategy”.
Proof. : We give the proof in four steps:
Step 1: For any u ∈ Ut,T , v ∈ Vt,T , Ji(t, x;u, v) ◦ τ = Ji(t, x;u(τ), v(τ)), P-a.s.
The proof follows closely from the arguments in [8] or [9] and is therefore omitted.
Step 2: For β ∈ Bt,T , let β̂(u) := β(u(τ−1))(τ), u ∈ Ut,T , and for α ∈ At,T , let α̂(v) := α(v(τ−1))(τ), v ∈
Vt,T . Then, β̂ ∈ Bt,T and α̂ ∈ At,T .
We only give the proof for β̂, since we can use a similar argument for α̂. From the definition of
β̂ we know that β̂ maps Ut,T into Vt,T .
(1) β̂ is a nonanticipative strategy. Indeed, let σ : Ω → [t, T ] be an F-stopping time and
u1, u2 ∈ Ut,T such that u1 ≡ u2 on [t, σ]. Since τ(Fs) := {τ(A), A ∈ Fs} = Fs, s ∈ [t, T ], the
assumptions i) and ii) imply that σ(τ−1) is still an F-stopping time. Obviously, we have u1(τ
−1) ≡
u2(τ
−1) on [[t, σ(τ−1)]]. From β ∈ Bt,T it follows that β(u1(τ−1)) = β(u2(τ−1)) on [[t, σ(τ−1)]].
Consequently,
β̂(u1) = β(u1(τ
−1))(τ) = β(u2(τ
−1))(τ) = β̂(u2) on [[t, σ]].
(2) β̂ is a strategy with delay. Since β is a nonanticipative strategy with delay, we have, for all
u ∈ Ut,T , the existence of an increasing sequence of stopping times {S′n(u)}n≥1 with
(a) t = S′0(u) ≤ S′1(u) ≤ · · · ≤ S′n(u) ≤ · · · ≤ T , (b)
⋃
n≥1{S′n(u) = T} = Ω, P-a.s.,
such that, for all Γ ∈ Ft and for all n ≥ 1 and u, u′ ∈ Ut,T , it holds: if u = u′ on [[t, S′n−1(u)]]
⋂
(Γ ×
[t, T ]), then (c) S′l(u) = S
′
l(u
′), on Γ, P-a.s., 1 ≤ l ≤ n, (d) β(u) = β(u′), on [t, S′n(u)]]
⋂
(Γ× [t, T ]).
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For all u ∈ Ut,T , we put Sn(u) = S′n(u(τ−1))(τ), n ≥ 1. It is easy to check that β̂ is a
nonanticipative strategy with delay. Moreover, since β(u) = β̂(u(τ))(τ−1), u ∈ Ut,T , we have that
{β̂ | β ∈ Bt,T } = Bt,T . Ditto for α̂.
Step 3: The following holds:(
esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
Ji(t, x;α, β)
)
(τ) = esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
(
Ji(t, x;α, β)(τ)
)
, P-a.s.
Taking into account the properties of τ , this relation can be proven in the same manner as the
corresponding relation in [9], also see [5].
Step 4: We now show that Wi(t, x)(τ) =Wi(t, x), P-a.s.
Let (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T . Then there exists a unique couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that
α(v) = u, β(u) = v. Consequently, due to Step 2, α̂(v(τ)) = u(τ) and β̂(u(τ)) = v(τ), and, thus, from
Step 1,
Ji(t, x;α, β)(τ) = Ji(t, x;u, v)(τ) = Ji(t, x;u(τ), v(τ)) = Ji(t, x; α̂, β̂), P− a.s.
Thus, since {α̂ | α ∈ At,T} = At,T and {β̂ | β ∈ Bt,T} = Bt,T , we conclude with Step 3,
Wi(t, x)(τ) = esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
(Ji(t, x;α, β)(τ))
= esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
Ji(t, x; α̂, β̂)
= esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
Ji(t, x;α, β)
= Wi(t, x), P-a.s.
We get the wished result.
For ℓ ≥ 1, let us define the transformation τℓ : Ω→ Ω such that
(τℓω)((t− ℓ, r]) = ω((t− 2ℓ, r − ℓ]) := ω(r − ℓ)− ω(t− 2ℓ);
(τℓω)((t− 2ℓ, r − ℓ]) = ω((t− ℓ, r]), for r ∈ [t− ℓ, t];
(τℓω)((s, r]) = ω((s, r]), (s, r] ∩ (t− 2ℓ, t] = ∅;
(τℓω)(0) = 0.
The transformation τℓ satisfies the assumptions i), ii) and iii) of Lemma 3.8. Therefore, W (t, x)(τℓ) =
W (t, x), P-a.s., ℓ ≥ 1. We have the following lemma by using arguments similar to that in [8].
Lemma 3.9. Let ζ ∈ L∞(Ω,Ft,P) be such that, for all ℓ ≥ 1 natural number, ζ(τℓ) = ζ, P-a.e. Then,
there exists some real C such that ζ = C, P-a.s.
By the definition of Wi(t, x) and Proposition 3.3 we can easily get the following properties for
our deterministic function Wi. The same proposition holds for Ui.
Proposition 3.10. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), there exists a constant C > 0 such that,
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x, x′ ∈ Rn,
|Wi(t, x)−Wi(t, x′)| ≤ C|x− x′|, |Wi(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|).
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We now recall the notion of stochastic backward semigroups, which was first introduced by
Peng [16] to study stochastic optimal control problems, and translated later by Buckdahn and Li [9]
to SDGs. For any stopping times σ, τ , with t ≤ σ ≤ τ ≤ T , and a random variable η ∈ L2(Ω,Fτ ,P;R),
we define
iGt,x;u,vσ,τ [η] :=
iŶ t,x;u,vσ ,
where ( iŶ t,x;u,vs , iẐ
t,x;u,v
s ,
iĤ
t,x;u,v
s )t≤s≤τ is the solution of the following BSDE:
−d iŶ t,x;u,vs = fNt,is (s,X
t,x;u,v
s ,
iŶ
t,x;u,v
s ,
iĤ
t,x;u,v
s ,
iẐ
t,x;u,v
s , us, vs)ds, s ∈ [t, τ ]
−λ iĤt,x;u,vs ds− iẐt,x;u,vs dBs − iĤt,x;u,vs dN˜s,
iŶ
t,x;u,v
τ = η,
where Xt,x;u,v is the solution of SDE (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ Rn.
We have the following dynamic programming principle (DPP) over a stochastic interval for our
games.
Theorem 3.11. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then the following dynamic programming
principle holds: For any stopping time τ with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ T, x ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2,
Wi(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,τ
essinf
β∈Bt,τ
iG
t,x;α,β
t,τ [WNt,iτ (τ,X
t,x;α,β
τ )],
Ui(t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt,τ
esssup
α∈At,τ
iG
t,x;α,β
t,τ [UNt,iτ (τ,X
t,x;α,β
τ )].
This DPP for stopping times will play a crucial role in Section 4. Since the proof is rather long
and technical, we postpone it to Subsection 6.1.
4 Probabilistic interpretation of associated coupled systems of Isaacs
equations
The objective of this section is to give a probabilistic interpretation of coupled systems of Isaacs
equations. More precisely, we show that the value functions U = (U1, U2) and W = (W1,W2),
introduced in Section 3, are viscosity solutions of the following coupled Isaacs equations:{
∂
∂t
Ui(t, x) +H
+
i (t, x, U1(t, x), U2(t, x),DUi(t, x),D
2Ui(t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) ×Rn,
Ui(T, x) = Φi(x), i = 1, 2,
(4.1)
and{
∂
∂t
Wi(t, x) +H
−
i (t, x,W1(t, x),W2(t, x),DWi(t, x),D
2Wi(t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn,
Wi(T, x) = Φi(x), i = 1, 2,
(4.2)
respectively, where for (t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R× R× Rd × Sd × U × V ,
Hi(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v) =
1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pb(t, x, u, v) + f˜i(t, x, y1, y2, pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v),
H−i (t, x, y1, y2, p, A) = sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
Hi(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v),
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H+i (t, x, y1, y2, p, A) = inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
Hi(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v).
Let us recall the definition of a viscosity solution of the system (4.1). We denote by C3l,b([0, T ] × Rn)
the set of real-valued functions which are continuously differentiable up to third order and whose
derivatives of order from 1 to 3 are bounded.
Definition 4.1. A continuous function V = (V1, V2) ∈ C([0, T ] ×Rn;R2) is called
(i) a viscosity subsolution of the system (4.1) if Vi(T, x) ≤ Φi(x), for all i = 1, 2, x ∈ Rn, and if for
all test functions ϕ ∈ C3l,b([0, T ]×Rn), i = 1, 2, and (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn such that Vi−ϕ attains a local
maximum at (t, x),
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x) +H+i (t, x, V1(t, x), V2(t, x),Dϕ(t, x),D
2ϕ(t, x)) ≥ 0, (4.3)
(ii) a viscosity supersolution of the system (4.1) if Vi(T, x) ≥ Φi(x), for all i = 1, 2, x ∈ Rn, and if
for all functions ϕ ∈ C3l,b([0, T ]×Rn), i = 1, 2, and (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn such that Vi − ϕ attains a local
minimum at (t, x),
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x) +H+i (t, x, V1(t, x), V2(t, x),Dϕ(t, x),D
2ϕ(t, x)) ≤ 0, (4.4)
(iii) a viscosity solution of the system (4.1) if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a supersolution of
the system (4.1). In the same way we can define a viscosity solution of the system (4.2).
We now give the main result in this section. We shall give the proof in Section 6.2 since it is
rather lengthy.
Theorem 4.2. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then U = (U1, U2) (resp., W = (W1,W2))
is a viscosity solution of the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)).
To state a uniqueness theorem for the viscosity solution of the system (4.1), let us first define
the following space:
Θ : =
{
ϕ ∈ C([0, T ]× Rn) : there exists a constant A > 0 such that
lim
|x|→∞
|ϕ(t, x)| exp{−A[log((|x|2 + 1) 12 )]2} = 0, uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ]
}
.
Theorem 4.3. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then there exists at most one viscosity
solution u ∈ Θ (resp., v ∈ Θ) of the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)).
The proof of the Theorem can be adapted from the arguments in Barles, Buckdahn and Pardoux
[1] combined with those of Barles and Imbert [2] to our framework. We omit it here.
Remark 4.4. Since U = (U1, U2) (resp., W = (W1,W2)) is a viscosity solution of linear growth,
U = (U1, U2) (resp., W = (W1,W2)) is the unique viscosity solution in Θ of the system (4.1) (resp.,
(4.2)).
An immediate consequence of this remark is that, under Isaacs condition:
For all (t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v) ∈ [0, T ] ×Rn × R× R× Rd × Sd × U × V, j = 1, 2, we have
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pb(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y1, y2, pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
= inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pb(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y1, y2, pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
,
(4.5)
the upper value and lower value functions coincide:
13
Corollary 4.5. Let Isaacs condition (4.5) hold. Then we have, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn,
(U1(t, x), U2(t, x)) = (W1(t, x),W2(t, x)).
However, for the next section, we need, in addition to the value functions we have already
introduced, also the following ones. For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, i = 1, 2, we define
W i(t, x) := esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
Ji(t, x;α, β), U i(t, x) := essinf
α∈At,T
esssup
β∈Bt,T
Ji(t, x;α, β).
Isaacs condition: For all (t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn ×R× R× Rd × Sd × U × V, j = 1, 2,
inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pb(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y1, y2, pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
= sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + pb(t, x, u, v) + fj(t, x, y1, y2, pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
,
(4.6)
Using a similar argument in Sections 3 and 4 we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. Let Isaacs condition (4.6) hold. Then we have, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
(U 1(t, x), U 2(t, x)) = (W 1(t, x),W 2(t, x)).
Remark 4.7. By virtue of a similar argument in Sections 3 and 4 we can get, for i = 1, 2, U i and
W i have the similar properties to Ui and Wi, respectively. We omit them here. But we will use them
in Section 5.
5 Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential
games with coupled cost functionals
The objective of this section is to investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum SDGs. An
existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs are obtained.
In order to study Nash equilibrium payoffs, we redefine the following notations which differ from
those of the preceding sections. Let us define: For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
W1(t, x) := esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J1(t, x;α, β), W2′(t, x) := esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J2(t, x;α, β),
and
W1′(t, x) := esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
J1(t, x;α, β), W2(t, x) := esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
J2(t, x;α, β).
In all what follows we assume that the Isaacs conditions (4.5) and (4.6) hold, and that all the coefficients
are bounded. This latter assumption is not necessary, but has the objective to simplify the arguments.
Under the Isaacs conditions (4.5) and (4.6), from Corollary 4.5 and Proposition 4.6, we have, for
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
W1(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J1(t, x;α, β) = essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
J1(t, x;α, β),
W2(t, x) = essinf
α∈At,T
esssup
β∈Bt,T
J2(t, x;α, β) = esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
J2(t, x;α, β), (5.1)
W1′(t, x) = esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
J1(t, x;α, β) = essinf
α∈At,T
esssup
β∈Bt,T
J1(t, x;α, β),
W2′(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J2(t, x;α, β) = essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
J2(t, x;α, β).
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Remark 5.1. Not only Hamiltonians of the form H1(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u) +H2(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, v), for
(t, x, y1, y2, p, A, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn ×R×R×Rd × Sd ×U × V , are covered by Isaacs conditions (4.5)
and (4.6), as the following example shows:
sup
v∈[−1,1]
inf
u∈[0,1]
vu2 = inf
u∈[0,1]
sup
v∈[−1,1]
vu2 = 0,
and
inf
v∈[−1,1]
sup
u∈[0,1]
vu2 = sup
u∈[0,1]
inf
v∈[−1,1]
vu2 = 0.
We also define the following function: for j = 1, 2, l = 1, 2,
nj(l) =
{
j, l = j,
l′, l 6= j.
We now give the definition of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum SDGs, which is similar
to that in [6] and [14].
Definition 5.2. For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, a couple (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is called a Nash equilibrium payoff
at the point (t, x), if for any ε > 0, there exists a couple (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T such that, for all
(α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;α, βε)− ε, J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε, β) − ε, P− a.s., (5.2)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;αε, βε)]− ej | ≤ ε, j = 1, 2.
Remark 5.3. We notice that unlike in [6] our cost functionals Jj(t, x;α, β), j = 1, 2, are not nec-
essarily deterministic. Indeed, while [6] is based on the approach by Fleming and Souganidis [10] in
which the admissible cost functionals for a game over the fixed time interval [t, T ] are independent of
Ft, the present paper is based on the approaches developed in [9], [5] and in [8].
The following equivalent condition of (5.2) follows easily from Lemma 3.6.
Lemma 5.4. For any ε > 0, let (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T . Then (5.2) holds if and only if, for all
(u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;u, βε(u)) − ε, P− a.s.,
J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε(v), v) − ε, P− a.s.
(5.3)
As in [14], before giving the characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs, we first state
two important lemmas.
Lemma 5.5. For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, we fix arbitrarily u ∈ Ut,T . Then,
(i) for all stopping time τ ∈ [t, T ] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T such that,
for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v) = u, on [[t, τ ]],
2Y t,x;α(v),vτ ≤ Wn2(Nt,2τ )(τ,X
t,x;α(v),v
τ ) + ε, P− a.s.
(ii) for all stopping time τ ∈ [t, T ] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T such that,
for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v) = u, on [[t, τ ]],
1Y t,x;α(v),vτ ≥ Wn1(Nt,1τ )(τ,X
t,x;α(v),v
τ )− ε, P− a.s.
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Proof. Let us only give the proof of (i); that of (ii) can be carried out with a similar argument. We
notice that Vτ,T can be regarded as a subset of Bτ,T . Indeed, putting βv′(u′) = v′, u′ ∈ Uτ,T , we
associate all v′ ∈ Vτ,T with some βv′ ∈ Bτ,T . Therefore, for any y ∈ Rn, similar to Proposition 6.13
we have
W
n2(N
t,2
τ )
(τ, y) = essinf
α∈Aτ,T
esssup
β∈Bτ,T
J
N
t,2
τ
(τ, y;α, β)
≥ essinf
α∈Aτ,T
esssup
v∈Vτ,T
J
N
t,2
τ
(τ, y;α(v), v), P− a.s.
Then, for any ε0 > 0, by standard arguments we have the existence of αy ∈ Aτ,T such that
W
n2(N
t,2
τ )
(τ, y) ≥ esssup
v∈Vτ,T
J
N
t,2
τ
(τ, y;αy(v), v) − ε0, P− a.s. (5.4)
We let {Oi}i≥1 ⊂ B(Rn) be a partition of Rn such that
∑
i≥1
Oi = R
n, Oi 6= ∅, and diam(Oi) ≤ ε0, i ≥ 1.
For yi ∈ Oi, i ≥ 1 and v ∈ Vt,T , let us set
α(v)s =
{
us, s ∈ [[t, τ ]],∑
i≥1
1{Xt,x;u,vτ ∈Oi}αyi(v|[τ,T ])s, s ∈]]τ, T ]]. (5.5)
Then α : Vt,T → Ut,T is an NAD strategy. This can be checked in a straight-forward way and is
omitted in order to shorten the proof.
By virtue of Proposition 3.10, Remark 4.7, (5.4) and (5.5), we deduce that, for v ∈ Vt,T ,
W
n2(N
t,2
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;α(v),vτ )
≥
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v),v
τ ∈Oi}
W
n2(N
t,2
τ )
(τ, yi)− Cε0
≥
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v),v
τ ∈Oi}
J
N
t,2
τ
(τ, yi;αyi(v|[τ,T ]), v)− Cε0
=
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v),v
τ ∈Oi}
J
N
t,2
τ
(τ, yi;α(v), v) − Cε0.
Consequently, due to Proposition 3.3 we conclude
W
n2(N
t,2
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;α(v),vτ ) ≥
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v),v
τ ∈Oi}
J
N
t,2
τ
(τ,Xt,x;α(v),vτ ;α(v), v) − Cε0
= J
N
t,2
τ
(τ,Xt,x;α(v),vτ ;α(v), v) − Cε0,
where C is a constant which can be different from line to line and is independent of v ∈ Vt,T .
Recalling that ε0 > 0 hasn’t been specified yet, let us choose ε0 = C
−1ε. We observe that
J
N
t,2
τ
(τ,Xt,x;α(v),vτ ;α(v), v) =
N
t,2
τ Y τ,X
t,x;α(v),v
τ ,α(v),v
τ =
2Y t,x,α(v),vτ .
Then we deduce that
W
n2(N
t,2
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;α(v),vτ ) ≥ 2Y t,x,α(v),vτ − ε, v ∈ Vt,T .
This conclude the proof.
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The following lemma follows from standard estimates for SDEs.
Lemma 5.6. There exists a positive constant C such that, for all (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T , and for
all F-stopping times σ : Ω → [t, T ] with Xt,x;u,vσ = Xt,x;u
′,v′
σ , P− a.s., we have the following estimate:
for all real r ∈ [t, T ],
E[ sup
0≤s≤r
|Xt,x;u,v(σ+s)∧T −Xt,x;u
′,v′
(σ+s)∧T |2
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ Cr, P− a.s.
Let us now give the following characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player
nonzero-sum SDGs.
Theorem 5.7. For (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, a couple (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at point
(t, x) if and only if, for all ε > 0, there exists a couple (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T×Vt,T such that for all δ ∈ [0, T−t]
and j = 1, 2,
P
(
N
t,j
t+δ Y˜
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ ≥Wnj(Nt,jt+δ)(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )− ε | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε, P− a.s. (5.6)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;uε, vε)]− ej | ≤ ε. (5.7)
Remark 5.8. The characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs in [14] generalizes the results
in [6] from classical cost functionals without running cost to nonlinear cost functionals with running
cost defined by decoupled BSDEs. The above theorem on its part extends the result in [14]: on one
hand, we generalize [14] from SDGs without jumps to those with jumps. On the other hand, our cost
functionals are defined by a system of two coupled BSDEs.
Proof of Theorem 5.7: Necessity of (5.6) and (5.7).
Proof. Let us suppose that (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x). Then, by
Definition 5.2 we have, for sufficiently small ε > 0, the existence of (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T such that,
for all (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;α, βε)− ε4, J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε, β)− ε4,P− a.s., (5.8)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;αε, βε)]− ej | ≤ ε4, j = 1, 2. (5.9)
Since (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T , it follows from Lemma 3.6 that there exists a unique couple (uε, vε) ∈
Ut,T ×Vt,T such that αε(vε) = uε, βε(uε) = vε. We notice that from Proposition 3.2, (5.6) is equivalent
to
P
(
jY
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ ≥Wnj(Nt,jt+δ)(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )− ε | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε, P− a.s.
We make the proof by contradiction and suppose that (5.6) doesn’t hold true. Then, for all ε′ > 0,
there exists some ε ∈ (0, ε′) and some δ ∈ [0, T − t] such that, for some j ∈ {1, 2}, say for j = 1,
P
(
P( 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ < Wn1(Nt,1t+δ)
(t+ δ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )− ε | Ft) > ε
)
> 0. (5.10)
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Putting
A =
{
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ < Wn1(Nt,1t+δ)
(t+ δ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )− ε
}
∈ Ft+δ , (5.11)
and applying Lemma 5.5 to uε and t + δ, we have the existence of an NAD strategy α˜ ∈ At,T such
that, for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
α˜(v) = uε, on [t, t+ δ],
1Y
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ ≥ Wn1(Nt,1t+δ)(t+ δ,X
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ )−
ε
2
, P− a.s. (5.12)
From Lemma 3.6 we have the existence of a unique couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that α˜(v) =
u, βε(u) = v. From (5.12) we see that u = u
ε on [t, t+ δ], and we put
u˜ =
{
uε, on ([t, t+ δ[×Ω) ∪ ([t+ δ, T ] ×Ac),
u, on [t+ δ, T ] ×A.
Consequently, from the nonanticipativity of βε ∈ Bt,T we see that βε(u˜) = βε(uε) = vε on [t, t + δ],
and for all s ∈ [t+ δ, T ],
βε(u˜)s =
{
βε(u)s = vs, on A,
βε(u
ε)s = v
ε
s, on A
c.
Hence, standard arguments for SDEs and BSDEs yield
Xt,x;u˜,βε(u˜) = Xt,x;u
ε,vε , on [t, t+ δ],
Xt,x;u˜,βε(u˜) =
{
Xt,x;α˜(v),v , on [t+ δ, T ]×A,
Xt,x;u
ε,vε , on [t+ δ, T ]×Ac,
as well as
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t+δ =
{
1Y
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ , on A,
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ , on A
c.
Thus,
J1(t, x; u˜, βε(u˜)) =
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t =
1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t+δ ]
= 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t+δ 1A +
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t+δ 1Ac ]
= 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ 1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac ].
By virtue of Lemma 2.2 and (5.12) we conclude
J1(t, x; u˜, βε(u˜)) ≥ 1Gt,x;u˜,βε(u˜)t,t+δ [(Wn1(Nt,1t+δ)(t+ δ,X
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ )−
ε
2
)1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac ]
= 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [Wn1(Nt,1t+δ)
(t+ δ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac −
ε
2
1A].
Therefore, from (5.11) we deduce that
J1(t, x; u˜, βε(u˜)) ≥ 1Gt,x;u˜,βε(u˜)t,t+δ [(1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ + ε)1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac −
ε
2
1A]
= 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A]
= 1Gt,x;u
ε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A]. (5.13)
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Putting
ys =
1G
t,x;uε,vε
s,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A], s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
let us consider the following BSDE:
ys =
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A +
∫ t+δ
s
f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r , yr, hr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
−λ
∫ t+δ
s
hrdr −
∫ t+δ
s
zrdBr −
∫ t+δ
s
hrdN˜r, s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
as well as, for s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
s =
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
∫ t+δ
s
f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Ht,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
− λ
∫ t+δ
s
1Ht,x;u
ε,vε
r dr −
∫ t+δ
s
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
r dBr −
∫ t+δ
s
1Ht,x;u
ε,vε
r dN˜r.
In order to simplify the notations we suppose until the end of this proof that the dimension of the
Brownian motion d is equal to 1, since we can use a similar arguments for d > 1. Let us set
ys = ys − 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
s , hs = hs − 1Ht,x;u
ε,vε
s , zs = zs − 1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
s , s ∈ [t, t+ δ].
Then we conclude
ys =
ε
2
1A +
∫ t+δ
s
[f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r , yr, hr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
−f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Ht,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)]dr
−λ
∫ t+δ
s
hrdr −
∫ t+δ
s
zrdBr −
∫ t+δ
s
hrdN˜r, s ∈ [t, t+ δ]. (5.14)
Let us put, for r ∈ [t, t+ δ],
ar = 1{yr 6=0}(yr)
−1
(
f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r , yr, hr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
−f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r , hr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
)
,
br = 1{zr 6=0}(zr)
−1
(
f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Ht,x;u
ε,vε
r , zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
−f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Ht,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
)
,
cr = 1{hr 6=0}(hr)
−1
(
f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r , hr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
−f
N
t,1
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Ht,x;u
ε,vε
r , zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
)
.
Then, from (H5) we deduce that |ar| ≤ C, |br| ≤ C, |cr| ≤ C, and ĉr := cr − λ ≥ K − λ > −1, r ∈
[t, t+δ]. Consequently, there exists a constant ε0 > 0 small enough, such that ĉr ≥ −1+ε0, r ∈ [t, t+δ],
and BSDE (5.14) can be written as follows:
ys =
ε
2
1A +
∫ t+δ
s
[aryr + brzr + ĉrhr]dr −
∫ t+δ
s
zrdBr −
∫ t+δ
s
hrdN˜r. (5.15)
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Let us put
Mt,t+δ = exp
( ∫ t+δ
t
brdBr − 1
2
∫ t+δ
t
|br|2dr − λ
∫ t+δ
t
ĉrdr
) ∏
t<r≤t+δ
(1 + ĉr∆Nr).
Then from the Girsanov theorem we know that there exists a probability measure Q = Mt,t+δ · P
defined on (Ω,F) such that
N̂s = N˜s −
∫ s∧(t+δ)
t
ĉrdr, s ∈ [t, T ],
is an (F,Q)-martingale, and
B̂s = Bs −
∫ s∧(t+δ)
t
brdr, s ∈ [t, T ],
is an (F,Q)-Brownian motion, and both are independent underQ. Therefore, (5.15) takes the following
form:
ys =
ε
2
1A +
∫ t+δ
s
aryrdr −
∫ t+δ
s
zrdB̂r −
∫ t+δ
s
hrdN̂r, s ∈ [t, t+ δ].
By applying Itoˆ’s formula to yse
∫ s
t
ardr we obtain
yt =
ε
2
EQ[1Ae
∫ t+δ
t
ardr |Ft] = ε
2
E[1AMt,t+δe
∫ t+δ
t
ardr |Ft].
Thanks to the Ho¨lder inequality we have
P(A|Ft)2 = (E[1A|Ft])2 ≤ E[1AMt,t+δe
∫ t+δ
t
ardr |Ft]E[M−1t,t+δe−
∫ t+δ
t
ardr |Ft].
On the other hand,
E[M−1t,t+δe
−
∫ t+δ
t
ardr |Ft]
= E[exp
(
−
∫ t+δ
t
ardr −
∫ t+δ
t
brdBr +
1
2
∫ t+δ
t
|br|2dr + λ
∫ t+δ
t
ĉrdr
)
×
∏
t<r≤t+δ
(1 + ĉr∆Nr)
−1| Ft]
= E[exp
(
−
∫ t+δ
t
ardr −
∫ t+δ
t
brdBr +
1
2
∫ t+δ
t
|br|2dr + λ
∫ t+δ
t
ĉrdr
)
× exp
(
−
∫ t+δ
t
ln(1 + ĉr)dNr
)
| Ft]
≤ exp((1 + λ)CT )E[exp
(
−
∫ t+δ
t
brdBr − 1
2
∫ t+δ
t
|br|2dr
)
exp
(
−
∫ t+δ
t
ln(ε0)dNr
)
| Ft]
≤ C−10 ,
for some suitably chosen constant C0 > 0. Consequently, putting
∆ =
{
P
(
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ < WNt,1
t+δ
(t+ δ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )− ε | Ft
)
> ε
}(
= {P(A|Ft) > ε}
)
,
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we have
yt =
ε
2
E[1AMt,t+δe
∫ t+δ
t
ardr |Ft] ≥ εC0
2
(E[1A|Ft])2
=
εC0
2
(P(A|Ft))2 > ε
3
2
C01∆.
Thus, since
yt = yt − 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t =
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A]− 1Gt,x;u
ε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ ],
we obtain
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A] >
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ ] +
ε3
2
C01∆.
Therefore, (5.13) yields
J1(t, x; u˜, βε(u˜)) > J1(t, x;αε, βε) +
ε3
2
C01∆.
Let us choose ε′ sufficiently small such that
ε′3
2
C0 > ε
′4. Then we have
ε3
2
C0 > ε
4. Since P(∆) > 0,
we have a contradiction with (5.8) for α(·) = u˜. The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 5.7: Sufficiency of (5.6) and (5.7).
Proof. We fix arbitrarily ε > 0. For ε0 > 0 being specified later let us assume that (u
ε0 , vε0) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T satisfies (5.6) and (5.7), i.e., for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
P
(
jY t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s ≥Wnj(Nt,js )(s,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
s )− ε0 | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε0, P− a.s., (5.16)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;uε0 , vε0)]− ej | ≤ ε0, (5.17)
where we use Proposition 3.2 for getting the first inequality.
Let us put ti = t+i
T−t
m
, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, and δ = T−t
m
, wherem will be specified at the end of the proof
of Lemma 5.9. Let us apply Lemma 5.5 to uε0 and τ = t1, · · · , tm, successively. Then, for ε1 > 0 (ε1
depends on ε and is specified later) we have the existence of NAD strategies αi ∈ At,T , i = 1, · · · ,m,
such that, for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
αi(v) = u
ε0 , on [t, ti],
2Y
t,x;αi(v),v
ti
≤ W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)(ti,X
t,x;αi(v),v
ti
) + ε1,P− a.s. (5.18)
For all v ∈ Vt,T , let us define
Sv = inf
{
s ≥ t | λ({r ∈ [t, s] : vr 6= vε0r }) > 0
}
,
tv = inf
{
ti ≥ Sv | i = 1, · · · ,m
}
∧ T.
Here we denote by λ the Lebesgue measure on the real line R. Then, Sv and tv are stopping times,
and Sv ≤ tv ≤ Sv + δ. Let us set
αε(v) =
{
uε0 , on [t, tv ],
αi(v), on (ti, T ]× {tv = ti}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
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Then αε is an NAD strategy, and by virtue of (5.18) we obtain
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
tv =
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
ti
1{tv=ti}
≤
m∑
i=1
W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;αε(v),v
ti
)1{tv=ti} + ε1
= W
n2(N
t,2
tv
)(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv ) + ε1, P− a.s. (5.19)
Let us admit the following lemma for the moment; we shall prove it after.
Lemma 5.9. For all ε > 0 and v ∈ Vt,T ,
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;uε0 , vε0) + ε, αε(vε0) = uε0 ,
for (uε0 , vε0) from (5.16).
By a similar argument as that for Lemma 5.9 we can construct βε ∈ Bt,T such that, for all
u ∈ Ut,T ,
J1(t, x;u, βε(u)) ≤ J1(t, x;uε0 , vε0) + ε, βε(uε0) = vε0 .
From the latter both inequalities, (5.17) and Lemma 5.4 it follows that (αε, βε) satisfies Definition 5.2.
Consequently, (e1, e2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Proof of Lemma 5.9: From (5.19) and the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 we get the existence of a positive
constant C such that
J2(t, x, αε(v), v) =
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x,αε(v),v
tv ] ≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv ) + ε1]
≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )] + Cε1. (5.20)
From Proposition 3.10, Lemma 5.6 as well as the definitions of tv and αε it follows that
E[|W
n2(N
t,2
tv
)(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )−Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )|2
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ Cδ, P− a.s.
Consequently, by virtue of Lemma 2.3 we deduce that
| 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )]− 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v ,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )]|
≤ CE[|W
n2(N
t,2
tv
)
(tv,Xt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv )−Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )|2
∣∣∣Ft] 12 ≤ Cδ 12 ,
from which, combined with (5.20), we get
J2(t, x, αε(v), v)
≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1
+| 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )]− 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )]|
≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1 +Cδ
1
2 .
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For s ∈ [t, T ], we put
Ωs =
{
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s ≥Wn2(Nt,2s )(s,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
s )− ε0
}
.
Then we have
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [Wn2(Nt,2tv )(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1 + Cδ
1
2
≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [
m∑
i=1
W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
+Cε1 + Cδ
1
2 + I, (5.21)
where
I = | 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [
m∑
i=1
W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}]
− 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [
m∑
i=1
W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]|.
Noting Lemma 2.3, (5.16) as well as the boundedness of W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)
we conclude
I ≤ E[
m∑
i=1
|W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)|21{tv=ti}1Ωcti
∣∣∣Ft] 12
≤ C
m∑
i=1
P(Ωcti |Ft)
1
2 ≤ Cmε
1
2
0 . (5.22)
Since 2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti
≥W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)− ε0 on Ωti , it follows from Lemma 2.3 that
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
1{tv=ti}1Ωti + ε0]
≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
1{tv=ti}1Ωti ] + Cε0.
Similarly to (5.22) we have
| 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]− 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
1{tv=ti}]| ≤ Cmε
1
2
0 ,
from which together with 2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv =
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
1{tv=ti} it follows that
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
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≤ 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ] + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
≤ | 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [ 2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ]− 2Gt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
+ 2Gt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ] + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
= | 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [ 2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ]− 2Gt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
+J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 .
Using arguments similar to those in [14] we can show that
| 2Gt,x;αε(v),vt,tv [ 2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ]− 2Gt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]| ≤ Cδ
1
2 .
Consequently,
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W
n2(N
t,2
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ Cδ 12 + J2(t, x;uε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 .
Thus, from (5.21) and (5.22) we have
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;uε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 + Cε1 + Cδ
1
2 .
We can choose δ > 0, ε0 > 0, and ε1 > 0 such that Cε0 +Cmε
1
2
0 + Cε1 + Cδ
1
2 ≤ ε and ε0 < ε. Thus,
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;uε0 , vε0) + ε, v ∈ Vt,T .
This allows us to complete the proof. 
One of our main results of this section is the following existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium
payoff.
Theorem 5.10. Under the Isaacs condition, there exists a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x), for all
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
From Theorem 5.7 we only have to prove that, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T
such that (5.6) and (5.7) hold, for δ ∈ [0, T − t], j = 1, 2. The following proposition is crucial for this
proof and it will be proven after.
Proposition 5.11. For all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T independent of Ft such that, for
all stopping time τ (t ≤ τ ≤ T ) independent of Ft, j = 1, 2, (5.6) holds:
P
(
N
t,j
τ Y˜ t,x;u
ε,vε
τ ≥Wnj(Nt,jτ )(τ,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ )− ε | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε, P− a.s.
From the above proposition we immediately have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.12. For all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T independent of Ft such that, for all
s ∈ [t, T ], j = 1, 2, (5.6) holds:
P
(
N
t,j
s Y˜ t,x;u
ε,vε
s ≥Wnj(Nt,js )(s,X
t,x;uε,vε
s )− ε | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε, P− a.s.
We now give the proof of Theorem 5.10.
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Proof. For ε > 0, let (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T×Vt,T be that of Corollary 5.12. Then (5.6) holds. By noticing that
(uε, vε) is independent of Ft we see that Jj(t, x;uε, vε), j = 1, 2, are deterministic and
{
(J1(t, x;u
ε, vε),
J2(t, x;u
ε, vε)), ε > 0
}
is a bounded sequence. Therefore, we can choose an accumulation point of this
sequence, as ε → 0, and we denote this point by (e1, e2). Consequently, from Theorem 5.7 it follows
that (e1, e2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x). The proof is complete.
Before proving Proposition 5.11, let us first make some preliminaries for its proof.
Lemma 5.13. For all ε > 0, δ ∈ [0, T − t] and x ∈ Rn, we have the existence of (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T
independent of Ft, such that, j = 1, 2,
Wj(t, x)− ε ≤ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
t,t+δ [Wnj(Nt,jt+δ)
(t+ δ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )], P− a.s.
For its proof, we adapt the ideas developed in [14] from SDGs without jumps to SDGs with
jumps.
Proof. We denote by Ft = (F ts)s∈[t,T ] the following filtration:
F ts := σ
{
Br −Bt, Nr −Nt : t ≤ r ≤ s
}
∨ NP, s ∈ [t, T ],
where NP is the collection of all P-null sets. For s ∈ [t, T ], we denote by U ts,T (resp., Vts,T ) the set
of Ft-adapted processes {ur}r∈[s,T ] (resp., {vr}r∈[s,T ]) taking their values in U (resp., V ), and we let
Ats,T (resp., Bts,T ) be the NAD strategies from Vts,T into U ts,T (resp., U ts,T into Vts,T ).
Let us replace the framework of SDEs driven by a Brownian motion B = (Bs)s∈[0,T ] by that
of SDEs driven by a Brownian motion (Bs − Bt)s∈[t,T ], and let us also replace the framework of
BSDEs driven by a Brownian motion B = (Bs)s∈[0,T ] and the Poisson process (Ns)s∈[t,T ] by that of
Bt = (Bs − Bt)s∈[t,T ] and (Ns − Nt)s∈[t,T ]. Using the arguments of the Sections 3 and 4 and Isaacs
conditions, we conclude, for (s, x) ∈ [t, T ]× Rn,
W˜1(s, x) = esssup
α∈Ats,T
essinf
β∈Bts,T
J1(s, x;α, β) = essinf
β∈Bts,T
esssup
α∈Ats,T
J1(s, x;α, β),
W˜2(s, x) = essinf
α∈Ats,T
esssup
β∈Bts,T
J2(s, x;α, β) = esssup
β∈Bts,T
essinf
α∈Ats,T
J2(s, x;α, β).
For j = 1, 2, it follows from the Sections 3 and 4 that Wj restricted to [t, T ] × Rn and W˜j are
inside the class of continuous functions with linear growth and the unique viscosity solutions of the
same system of Isaacs equations. Therefore,
W˜j(s, x) =Wj(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [t, T ]× Rn, j = 1, 2.
By virtue of the dynamic programming principle for W˜j and Vtt,t+δ ⊂ Btt,t+δ we deduce that
W1(t, x) = W˜1(t, x) = esssup
α∈At
t,t+δ
essinf
β∈Btt,t+δ
1G
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [Wn1(Nt,1t+δ)
(t+ δ,Xt,x;α,βt+δ )]
≤ esssup
α∈At
t,t+δ
essinf
v∈Vt
t,t+δ
1G
t,x;α(v),v
t,t+δ [Wn1(Nt,1t+δ)
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ )].
Therefore, for ε > 0 and δ > 0, we have the existence of αε ∈ Att,t+δ such that, for all v ∈ Vtt,t+δ,
W1(t, x)− ε ≤ 1Gt,x;αε(v),vt,t+δ [Wn1(Nt,1t+δ)(t+ δ,X
t,x;αε(v),v
t+δ )], P− a.s.
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By a symmetric argument there exists βε ∈ Btt,t+δ such that, for all u ∈ U tt,t+δ,
W2(t, x)− ε ≤ 2Gt,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ [Wn2(Nt,2t+δ)(t+ δ,X
t,x;u,βε(u)
t+δ )], P− a.s.
In analogy to Lemma 3.6, it can be shown that there exists a unique couple (uε, vε) ∈ U tt,t+δ × Vtt,t+δ
such that αε(v
ε) = uε, βε(u
ε) = vε. Consequently,
Wj(t, x)− ε ≤ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
t,t+δ [Wnj(Nt,jt+δ)
(t+ δ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )], j = 1, 2.
This completes the proof.
Also the following Lemma is crucial for the proof of Proposition 5.11.
Lemma 5.14. For n ≥ 1, we fix some partition t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T of the interval [t, T ]. Then,
for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T independent of Ft, such that, for all i = 0, · · · , n − 1
and j = 1, 2,
W
nj(N
t,j
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε ≤ jGt,x;uε,vεti,ti+1 [Wnj(Nt,jti+1 )(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)], P− a.s.
Proof. Let us prove it by induction. Obviously, due to the above lemma, it holds for i = 0. Let a couple
(uε, vε) independent of Ft, be constructed on the interval [t, ti), and we shall give its definition on
[ti, ti+1). By virtue of the above lemma we have, for all y ∈ Rn, the existence of (uy, vy) ∈ Uti,T ×Vti,T
independent of Ft, such that,
Wj(ti, y)− ε
2
≤ jGti,y;uy,vyti,ti+1 [Wnj(Nti,jti+1 )(ti+1,X
ti,y;uy,vy
ti+1
)], P− a.s, j = 1, 2. (5.23)
For j = 1, 2, y, z ∈ Rn and s ∈ [ti, ti+1], let us set
y1s =
jG
ti,y;u
y,vy
s,ti+1
[W
nj(N
ti,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
ti+1
)],
and
y2s =
jG
ti,z;uy,vy
s,ti+1
[W
nj(N
ti,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,z;uy,vy
ti+1
)].
Then let us consider the following associated BSDEs:
y1s = Wnj(N
ti,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
ti+1
) +
∫ ti+1
s
f
N
ti,j
r
(r,Xti,y;u
y,vy
r , y
1
r , h
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr
−λ
∫ ti+1
s
h1rdr −
∫ ti+1
s
z1rdBr −
∫ ti+1
s
h1rdN˜r, s ∈ [ti, ti+1],
as well as
y2s = Wnj(N
ti,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1
) +
∫ ti+1
s
f
N
ti,j
r
(r,Xti,z;u
y,vy
r , y
2
r , h
2
r , z
2
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr
−λ
∫ ti+1
s
h2rdr −
∫ ti+1
s
z2rdBr −
∫ ti+1
s
h2rdN˜r, s ∈ [ti, ti+1].
From Lemma 2.3 it follows that
|jGti,y;uy,vyti,ti+1 [Wnj(Nti,jti+1 )(ti+1,X
ti,y;uy,vy
ti+1
)]− jGti,z;uy,vyti,ti+1 [Wnj(Nti,jti+1 )(ti+1,X
ti,z;uy,vy
ti+1
)]|2
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≤ CE[|W
nj(N
ti,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,y;uy,vy
ti+1
)−W
nj(N
ti,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,z;uy,vy
ti+1
)|2
∣∣∣Fti ]
+CE[
∫ ti+1
ti
|f
N
ti,j
r
(r,Xti,y;u
y,vy
r , y
1
r , h
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )
−f
N
ti,j
r
(r,Xti,z;u
y,vy
r , y
1
r , h
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )|2dr
∣∣∣Fti ]
≤ CE[|Xti,y;uy,vyti+1 −X
ti,z;uy,vy
ti+1
|2
∣∣∣Fti ] + CE[∫ ti+1
ti
|Xti,y;uy,vyr −Xti,z;u
y,vy
r |2dr
∣∣∣Fti ]
≤ C|y − z|2.
Thus, due to Proposition 3.10 and (5.23) we obtain, for C|y − z| ≤ ε
2
,
Wj(ti, z) − ε ≤ Wj(ti, y)− ε+ C|y − z|
≤ jGti,y;uy,vyti,ti+1 [Wnj(Nti,jti+1 )(ti+1,X
ti,y;uy,vy
ti+1
)]− ε
2
+ C|y − z|
≤ jGti,z;uy,vyti,ti+1 [Wnj(Nti,jti+1 )(ti+1,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1
)]− ε
2
+ C|y − z|
≤ jGti,z;uy,vyti,ti+1 [Wnj(Nti,jti+1 )(ti+1,X
ti,z;uy,vy
ti+1
)], P− a.s.
We let {Oi}i≥1 ⊂ B(Rn) be a partition of Rn with diam(Oi) < ε
2C
and let yl ∈ Ol, l ≥ 1. Then, for
z ∈ Ol, it follows
Wnj(j)(ti, z) − ε ≤ jGti,z;u
yl ,vyl
ti,ti+1
[W
nj(N
ti,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,z;u
yl ,vyl
ti+1
)], P− a.s. (5.24)
Let us define
uε =
∑
l≥1
1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)uyl , vε =
∑
l≥1
1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)vyl .
Then, since {Xt,x;uε,vεti ∈ Ol} ∈ Fti , l ≥ 1, we conclude
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[W
nj(N
t,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)]
= jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[
∑
l≥1
W
nj(N
ti,N
t,j
ti
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti+1
)1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]
= jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[
∑
l≥1
W
nj(N
ti,N
t,j
ti
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti+1
)1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]
=
∑
l≥1
jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti,ti+1
[W
nj(N
ti,N
t,j
ti
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti+1
)]1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
).
From (5.24) it follows that
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[W
nj(N
t,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)] ≥
∑
l≥1
[W
nj(N
t,j
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε]1Ol(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
ti
)
= W
nj(N
t,j
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε,
from which we conclude the wished result.
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Let us come, finally, to the proof of Proposition 5.11.
Proof. Let j = 1, 2 be arbitrarily fixed, and let τ be a stopping time independent of Ft, such that
t ≤ τ ≤ T . We put ti = i(T−t)2n + t, Ai =
{
ti−1 ≤ τ < ti
}
, i = 1, · · · , 2n, and define τn =
2n∑
i=1
ti1Ai .
It is obvious that 0 ≤ τn − τ ≤ 2−n. From Lemma 5.14 we know that, for all ε > 0, there exists
(uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T independent of Ft such that, for all stopping time τ independent of Ft, and for
all i (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1),
W
nj(N
t,j
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε0 ≤ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,ti+1
[W
nj(N
t,j
ti+1
)
(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)], P− a.s.
where ε0 > 0 depends on ε and n, and will be specified after.
From the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 it follows that, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1,
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,T
[Φ
N
t,j
T
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )] =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,t2n−1
[jGt,x;u
ε,vε
t2n−1,T
[Φ
N
t,j
T
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )]]
≥ jGt,x;uε,vεti,t2n−1 [Wnj(Nt,jt2n−1)(t2n−1,X
t,x;uε,vε
t2n−1
)− ε0]
≥ jGt,x;uε,vεti,t2n−1 [Wnj(Nt,jt2n−1)(t2n−1,X
t,x;uε,vε
t2n−1
)]− Cε0
≥ · · · ≥ jGt,x;uε,vεti,ti+1 [Wnj(Nt,jti+1)(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)]− C(2n − i)ε0
≥ W
nj(N
t,j
ti
)
(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− C(2n − i+ 1)ε0,
from where
jG
t,x;uε,vε
τn,T
[Φ
N
t,j
T
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )] =
2n∑
i=1
1Ai
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,T
[Φ
N
t,j
T
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )]
≥
2n∑
i=1
1AiWnj(Nt,jti )
(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− C
2n∑
i=1
1Ai(2
n − i+ 1)ε0
≥
2n∑
i=1
1AiWnj(Nt,jti )
(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− C2nε0 =Wnj(Nt,jτn )(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn )− C2nε0.
Therefore,
jG
t,x;uε,vε
τ,T [ΦNt,jT
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )] =
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
τ,τn [
jG
t,x;uε,vε
τn,T
[Φ
N
t,j
T
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )]]
≥ jGt,x;uε,vετ,τn [Wnj(Nt,jτn )(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn )− C2nε0]
≥ jGt,x;uε,vετ,τn [Wnj(Nt,jτn )(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn )]− C2nε0
= jGt,x;u
ε,vε
τ,τn
[W
nj(N
t,j
τn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn
)]− ε
2
= W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )−
ε
2
+ I2 − I1, (5.25)
for ε0 =
ε
C2n+1
, where
I1 =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
τ,T [ΦNt,jT
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )]− jGt,x;u
ε,vε
τ,τn [Wnj(Nt,jτn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn )] +
ε
2
,
I2 =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
τ,T [ΦNt,jT
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )]−Wnj(Nt,jτ )(τ,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ ) +
ε
2
, (5.26)
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and we put, for s ∈ [τ, τn],
y1s =
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s,τn
[W
nj(N
t,j
τn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn
)].
Obviously, (y1s)s∈[τ,τn] is the solution of the following BSDE:
y1s = Wnj(Nt,jτn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn ) +
∫ τn
s
f
N
ti,j
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r , y
1
r , h
1
r , z
1
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
−λ
∫ τn
s
h1rdr −
∫ τn
s
z1rdBr −
∫ τn
s
h1rdN˜r, s ∈ [τ, τn].
We will compare y1 with the process constant in time y2s = Wnj(Nt,jτ )(τ,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ ), s ∈ [τ, τn]. We
observe that (y2, z2) is the solution of a BSDE which driving coefficient equals to zero and z2 = 0.
Hence, from Lemma 2.3 it follows that
|jGt,x;uε,vετ,τn [Wnj(Nt,jτn )(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn )]−Wnj(Nt,jτ )(τ,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ )|2
≤ CE[|W
nj(N
t,j
τn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn )−Wnj(Nt,jτ )(τ,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ )|2
∣∣∣Fτ ]
+CE[
∫ τn
τ
|f
N
ti,j
r
(r,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
r , y
2
r , 0, 0, u
ε
r , v
ε
r)|2dr
∣∣∣Fτ ]
≤ CE[|W
nj(N
t,j
τn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn
)−W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )|2
∣∣∣Fτ ] + C2−n, (5.27)
where we have used the boundedness of fi, i = 1, 2.
By virtue of the Propositions 3.10 and 6.12 we deduce that
E[|W
nj(N
t,j
τn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn
)−W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )|2]
≤ 3E[|W
nj(N
t,j
τn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn )−Wnj(Nt,jτn )(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ )|2]
+3E[|W
nj(N
t,j
τn )
(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ )−Wnj(Nt,jτn )(τ,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ )|2]
+3E[|W
nj(N
t,j
τn )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )−Wnj(Nt,jτ )(τ,X
t,x;uε,vε
τ )|2]
≤ CE[|Xt,x;uε,vετn −Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ |2] + CE[(1 + |Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ |2)|τ − τn|] + CE[1{Nt,jτn 6=Nt,jτ }]
≤ C2−n,
where C > 0 is a constant which depends on x. Therefore, from (5.27) it follows that
E[| jGt,x;uε,vετ,τn [Wnj(Nt,jτn )(τn,X
t,x;uε,vε
τn
)]−W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )|2] ≤ C2−n.
Consequently, E[|I1−I2|2] ≤ C2−n. From (5.25) we see that I1 ≥ 0. Therefore, by the above inequality
we have
P(I2 ≤ −ε
2
) ≤ P(|I1 − I2| ≥ ε
2
) ≤ 4E[|I1 − I2|
2]
ε2
≤ 4C2
−n
ε2
≤ ε,
where we choose n such that 4C2−n ≤ ε3, i.e., n ≥ (2 + lnC − 3 ln ε
ln 2
), and from (5.26) we deduce
P
(
W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )− ε ≤ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
τ,T [ΦNt,jT
(Xt,x;u
ε,vε
T )]
)
> 1− ε,
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i.e.,
P
(
W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )− ε ≤ jY t,x;u
ε,vε
τ )]
)
> 1− ε.
Since (uε, vε) as well as τ are independent of Ft, the event
{
W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )−ε ≤ jY t,x;u
ε,vε
τ )
}
is
independent of Ft, from which we see that the conditional probability P(·|Ft) of
{
W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )−
ε ≤ jY t,x;uε,vετ )
}
coincides with its probability. Consequently,
P
(
W
nj(N
t,j
τ )
(τ,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
τ )− ε ≤ jY t,x;u
ε,vε
τ )| Ft
)
> 1− ε.
The proof is complete.
6 Proof of the Theorems 3.11 and 4.2
In this section we still use the notations in Sections 3 and 4.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 3.11
We have postponed to this section the proof of the DPP. We shall establish it first for deterministic
times, then we deduce the general version for stopping times.
6.1.1 Dynamic programming principle for deterministic times
Theorem 6.1. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), the following dynamic programming principle
(DPP) holds: For any 0 ≤ t < t+ δ ≤ T, x ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2,
Wi(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,t+δ
essinf
β∈Bt,t+δ
iG
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [WNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,Xt,x;α,βt+δ )]. (6.1)
Ui(t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt,t+δ
esssup
α∈At,t+δ
iG
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [UNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,Xt,x;α,βt+δ )].
Remark 6.2. Recall that for i = 1, 2, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, W (t, (x, i)) :=Wi(t, x) is the value function
of the stochastic differential game which dynamics is given by the process (Xt,x;u,v, N t,i), and which
cost functional is defined by our BSDE (3.4). The DPP for games with jumps but of the type ”strategy
against control” was proved in [8], and before, in another framework by Biswas [4]. However, unlike
[8] we have to deal here with games of the type ”NAD strategy against NAD strategy”.
Proof. For arbitrarily fixed i = 1, 2, we only give the proof for Wi(t, x), since for Ui(t, x) we can use a
symmetric argument. Let us denote by Wδ(t, x) the right hand side of (6.1). Using the arguments in
Proposition 3.7 we can show that Wδ(t, x) is deterministic. We split now the proof into the following
two lemmas.
Lemma 6.3. Wi(t, x) ≤Wδ(t, x).
Proof. From the definition of Wδ(t, x) it follows that
Wδ(t, x) = esssup
α1∈At,t+δ
essinf
β1∈Bt,t+δ
iG
t,x;α1,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,Xt,x;α1,β1t+δ )]
= esssup
α1∈At,t+δ
Iδ(t, x, α1),
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where Iδ(t, x, α1) = essinfβ1∈Bt,t+δ
iG
t,x;α1,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,i
t+δ
(t + δ,Xt,x;α1,β1t+δ )]. Then, there exists a sequence
{α1n, n ≥ 1} ⊂ At,t+δ, such that Wδ(t, x) = supn≥1 Iδ(t, x, α1n), P-a.s. For any ε > 0, let us put
Λn :=
{
Iδ(t, x, α
1
n) + ε ≥Wδ(t, x), Iδ(t, x, α1j ) + ε < Wδ(t, x), 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
}
∈ Ft, n ≥ 1.
Obviously, {Λn, n ≥ 1} is an (Ω,Ft)-partition. We define αε1 :=
∑
n≥1 1Λnα
1
n, then by straight-forward
proof it can be shown that αε1 belongs to At,t+δ. We let et (un, vn) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T be associated with
(α1n, β1) by Lemma 3.6, and put
uε1 :=
∑
n≥1
1Λnu
n, vε1 :=
∑
n≥1
1Λnv
n.
Then straight forward arguments allow to verify that (uε1, v
ε
1) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T is associated with (αε, β1)
by Lemma 3.6 such that αε(vε1) = u
ε
1, β1(u
ε
1) = v
ε
1. Consequently, the uniqueness of the FBSDE and
the definition of NAD strategies allows to show that, for all β1 ∈ Bt,t+δ,
Xt,x;α
ε
1,β1 =
∑
n≥1
1ΛnX
t,x;α1n,β1 ,
and
iG
t,x;αε1,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,it+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )] =
∑
n≥1
iG
t,x;α1n,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,it+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1n,β1
t+δ )]1Λn . (6.2)
Therefore, for all β1 ∈ Bt,t+δ,
Wδ(t, x) ≤
∑
n≥1
1ΛnIδ(t, x, α
1
n) + ε
≤
∑
n≥1
1Λn
iG
t,x;α1n,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,it+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1n,β1
t+δ )] + ε
= iG
t,x;αε1,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,it+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )] + ε, P-a.s. (6.3)
We let {Oj}j≥1 ⊂ B(Rn) be a partition of Rn such that
∑
j≥1
Oj = R
n and diam(Oj) ≤ ε, j ≥ 1. Let us
fix an element yj of Oj , j ≥ 1. Then, from the definition of Wk(t+ δ, y), k = 1, 2, it follows (through
a procedure already used above) that there exists αj,k2 ∈ At+δ,T such that, for all β2 ∈ Bt+δ,T ,
Wk(t+ δ, yj) ≤ essinf
β2∈Bt+δ,T
Jk(t+ δ, yj ;α
j,k
2 , β2) + ε, P-a.s.
Therefore, for all β2 ∈ Bt+δ,T ,
W
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ, yj) =
2∑
k=1
1
{Nt,i
t+δ=k}
W
t,i
k (t+ δ, yj)
≤
2∑
k=1
1
{Nt,it+δ=k}
Jk(t+ δ, yj ;α
j,k
2 , β2) + ε
≤ J
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ, yj ;α
j,N
t,i
t+δ
2 , β2) + ε, P-a.s. (6.4)
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For β ∈ Bt,T and u2 ∈ Ut+δ,T , we let β1(u1) := β(u1⊕u2)|[t,t+δ], u1 ∈ Ut,t+δ, where u1⊕u2 = u11[t,t+δ]+
u21(t+δ,T ]. Then β1 ∈ Bt,t+δ. Notice that β1 doesn’t depend on u2 thanks to the nonanticipativity
of β. Since (αε1, β1) ∈ At,t+δ × Bt,t+δ, we know from Lemma 3.6 that there exists a unique pair
(uε1, v
ε
1) ∈ Ut,t+δ × Vt,t+δ such that αε1(vε1) = uε1 and β1(uε1) = vε1. Let us define
βε2(u2) := β(u
ε
1 ⊕ u2)|[t+δ,T ], for u2 ∈ Ut+δ,T , αε2 :=
∑
j≥1
1Oj (X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )α
j,N
t,i
t+δ
2 .
Moreover, we put αε(v) := αε1(v1)⊕ αε2(v2), for v = v1 ⊕ v2, v1 ∈ Vt,t+δ, v2 ∈ Vt+δ,T . Since αε1 ∈ At,t+δ
and αε2 ∈ At+δ,T are NAD strategies, αε is also an NAD strategy.
From Proposition 3.10 it follows that
W
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )] ≤
∑
j≥1
1Oj (X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )WNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ, yj) + Cε,
which together with (6.3), (6.4) and Lemma 2.2 yields
Wδ(t, x) ≤ iGt,x;α
ε
1,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )] + ε,
≤ iGt,x;αε1,β1t,t+δ [
∑
j≥1
1Oj (X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )WNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ, yj) + Cε] + ε, P-a.s.
It follows from (6.4) and the Lemmas 2.2, 2.3 and 3.6 that
Wδ(t, x) ≤ iGt,x;α
ε
1,β1
t,t+δ [
∑
j≥1
1Oj (X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )WNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ, yj)] + Cε
≤ iGt,x;αε1,β1t,t+δ [
∑
j≥1
1Oj (X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )JNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ, yj ;α
j,N
t,i
t+δ
2 , β
ε
2) + ε] + Cε
≤ iGt,x;αε1,β1t,t+δ [
∑
j≥1
1Oj (X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ )JNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ, yj ;α
ε
2, β
ε
2)] + Cε
≤ iGt,x;αε1,β1t,t+δ [JNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
ε
2) + Cε] + Cε
≤ iGt,x;αε1,β1t,t+δ [JNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
ε
2)] + Cε
= iG
t,x;αε1,β1
t,t+δ [
N
t,i
t+δY
t+δ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
t+δ ;α
ε
2,β
ε
2
t+δ ] +Cε
= iG
t,x;αε1,β1
t,t+δ [
iY
t,x;αε,β
t+δ ] + Cε
= Ji(t, x;α
ε, β) + Cε, P-a.s, for all β ∈ Bt,T .
Consequently, due to the choice of αε we conclude Wδ(t, x) ≤ Wi(t, x) + Cε, P-a.s. Letting ε ↓ 0 we
have Wδ(t, x) ≤Wi(t, x).
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 6.1 we have to prove the converse inequality.
Lemma 6.4. Wδ(t, x) ≥Wi(t, x).
Proof. For an arbitrarily given α ∈ At,T and a given v2(·) ∈ Vt+δ,T , let us define
α1(v1) := α(v1 ⊕ v2)|[t,t+δ], v1(·) ∈ Vt,t+δ,
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where v1 ⊕ v2 := v11[t,t+δ] + v21(t+δ,T ]. Then α1 ∈ At,t+δ, and α1 does not depend on the choice of
v2(·) ∈ Vt+δ,T , since α is nonanticipative. Therefore, by virtue of the definition of Wδ(t, x) we know
that
Wδ(t, x) ≥ essinf
β1∈Bt,t+δ
iG
t,x;α1,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,Xt,x;α1,β1t+δ )], P-a.s.
Let us denote by Iδ(t, x, α1, β1) :=
iG
t,x;α1,β1
t,t+δ [WNt,i
t+δ
(t + δ,Xt,x;α1,β1t+δ )]. Then there exists a sequence
{β1n, n ≥ 1} ⊂ Bt,t+δ such that
Iδ(t, x, α1) := essinf
β1∈Bt,t+δ
Iδ(t, x, α1, β1) = infn≥1Iδ(t, x, α1, β
1
n), P-a.s.
For any ε > 0, n ≥ 1, we let
Λn := {Iδ(t, x, α1) ≥ Iδ(t, x, α1, β1n)− ε, Iδ(t, x, α1) < Iδ(t, x, α1, β1j )− ε, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1} ∈ Ft.
Then, {Λn} is a partition of (Ω,Ft). We define βε1 :=
∑
n≥1 1Λnβ
1
n, and it can be proven that
βε1 ∈ Bt,t+δ. Thanks to the uniqueness of the solution of the FBSDE we have
Iδ(t, x, α1, β
ε
1) =
∑
n≥1
1ΛnIδ(t, x, α1, β
1
n), P-a.s.
Indeed, this relation can be proved with an argument analogous to that for (6.2). Therefore,
Wδ(t, x) ≥ Iδ(t, x, α1) ≥
∑
n≥1
1ΛnIδ(t, x, α1, β
1
n)− ε = Iδ(t, x, α1, βε1)− ε
= iG
t,x;α1,βε1
t,t+δ [WNt,it+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ )]− ε, P-a.s.
Since (α1, β
ε
1) ∈ At,t+δ × Bt,t+δ, by Lemma 3.6 there exists an unique pair (uε1, vε1) ∈ Ut,t+δ × Vt,t+δ
such that α1(v
ε
1) = u
ε
1 and β
ε
1(u
ε
1) = v
ε
1. We also define α
ε
2(v2) := α(v
ε
1 ⊕ v2)|[t+δ,T ], v2 ∈ Vt+δ,T .
For any y ∈ Rn, k = 1, 2, from the definition of Wk(t+ δ, y) it follows that
Wk(t+ δ, y) ≥ essinf
β2∈Bt+δ,T
Jk(t+ δ, y;α
ε
2, β2), P-a.s, k = 1, 2.
Using the Lipschitz continuity of Wk(t+ δ, ·) and Jk(t+ δ, ·) we can prove by approximating Xt,x;α1,β
ε
1
t+δ
by a finite-valued random variable that
Wk(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ) ≥ essinf
β2∈Bt+δ,T
Jk(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β2), P-a.s, k = 1, 2.
Therefore,
W
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ) ≥ essinf
β2∈Bt+δ,T
J
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β2), P-a.s. (6.5)
Moreover, there exists some sequence {β2n, n ≥ 1} ⊂ Bt+δ,T such that
essinf
β2∈Bt+δ,T
J
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β2) = infn≥1JNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
2
n), P-a.s,
and we set, for n ≥ 1,
∆n : =
{
essinf
β2∈Bt+δ,T
J
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β2) ≥ JNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
2
n)− ε,
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essinf
β2∈Bt+δ,T
J
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β2) < JNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
2
j )− ε,
1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1
}
∈ Ft+δ .
Obviously, {∆n, n ≥ 1} is a partition of (Ω,Ft+δ). Let us define
βε2 :=
∑
n≥1
1∆nβ
2
n, β
ε(u1 ⊕ u2) := βε1(u1)⊕ βε2(u2),
for u1 ∈ Ut,t+δ and u2 ∈ Ut+δ,T . Then, from the uniqueness for the equations (3.1) and (3.4), combined
with Lemma 3.6, it follows that
J
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
ε
2) =
N
t,i
t+δY
t+δ,X
t,x;α1,β
ε
1
t+δ ;α
ε
2,β
ε
2
t+δ
=
∑
n≥1
1∆nJNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
2
n), P-a.s,
which together with (6.5) yields
W
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ) ≥ essinf
β2∈Bt+δ,T
J
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β2)
≥
∑
n≥1
1∆nJNt,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
2
n)− ε
= J
N
t,i
t+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ ;α
ε
2, β
ε
2)− ε
= N
t,i
t+δY
t+δ,X
t,x;α1,β
ε
1
t+δ ;α
ε
2,β
ε
2
t+δ − ε.
Let αε(v1 ⊕ v2) := α1(v1)⊕ αε2(v2), v1 ∈ Vt,t+δ, v2 ∈ Vt+δ,T . Then αε(v)|[t,t+δ] = α(v)|[t,t+δ], v ∈ Vt,T .
Thus,
N
t,i
t+δY
t+δ,X
t,x;α1,β
ε
1
t+δ ;α
ε
2,β
ε
2
t+δ =
iY
t,x;αε,βε
t+δ .
Consequently, by virtue of the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 we conclude
Wδ(t, x) ≥ Iδ(t, x, α1) ≥ iGt,x;α1,β
ε
1
t,t+δ [WNt,it+δ
(t+ δ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
t+δ )]− ε
≥ iGt,x;α1,βε1t,t+δ [ iY t,x;α
ε,βε
t+δ − ε]− ε
≥ iGt,x;αε,βεt,t+δ [ iY t,x;α
ε,βε
t+δ ]− Cε
= iY t,x;α
ε,βε
t −Cε = iY t,x;α,β
ε
t − Cε,
where, for the latter equality, we have used Lemma 3.6. Indeed, letting (uε2, v
ε
2) ∈ Ut+δ,T × Vt+δ,T be
associated with (αε2, β
ε
2) by Lemma 3.6 we have
βε(uε1 ⊕ uε2) = βε1(uε1)⊕ βε2(uε2) = vε1 ⊕ vε2,
αε(vε1 ⊕ vε2) = αε1(vε1)⊕ αε(vε1 ⊕ vε2)|[t+δ,T ] = uε1 ⊕ uε2,
but also αε(vε1 ⊕ vε2) = α(vε1 ⊕ vε2). Recalling now the arbitrariness of α ∈ At,T we conclude that
Wδ(t, x) ≥Wi(t, x)− Cε. Finally, letting ε ↓ 0 we have Wδ(t, x) ≥Wi(t, x).
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From the dynamic programming principle (Theorem 6.1) and standard arguments for BSDEs
(see Peng [16] or Buckdahn and Li [9]) we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6.5. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), W (t, x) is 12−Ho¨lder continuous in t, i.e.,
there exists a positive constant C such that, for all x ∈ Rn, t, t′ ∈ [0, T ],
|Wi(t, x)−Wi(t′, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)|t− t′| 12 .
6.1.2 Dynamic programming principle for stopping times
The objective of this subsection is to obtain the dynamic programming principle for stopping times.
For this end, we need the following proposition, which turns out to be crucial in our approach.
Proposition 6.6. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , let τ be a stopping time such that t ≤ τ ≤ T . Then we have
esssup
α1∈Aτ,T
essinf
β1∈Bτ,T
iY τ,x,α1,β1τ = esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
iY τ,x,α,βτ .
Proof. We give the proof in two steps.
Step 1: For all α ∈ At,T and an arbitrary fixed v0 ∈ Vt,τ , let us define
α1(v
1) := α(v0 ⊕ v1)|[τ,T ], v1 ∈ Vτ,T , and α0(v0) := α(v0 ⊕ v1)|[t,τ ], v1 ∈ Vτ,T .
It is straight-forward to check that α1 ∈ Aτ,T . Since α is nonanticipative, α0(v0) only depends on v0,
but not on v1. We put u0 := α0(v
0) and define, for u ∈ Ut,T and β1 ∈ Bτ,T β(u) := v0 ⊕ β1(u1), u1 =
u|[τ,T ]. Then β ∈ Bt,T .
Since α1 ∈ Aτ,T and β1 ∈ Bτ,T , by Lemma 3.6, we have the existence of a unique couple
(u˜1, v˜1) ∈ Uτ,T × Vτ,T such that α1(v˜1) = u˜1, β1(u˜1) = v˜1. On the other hand, for α ∈ At,T and
β ∈ Bt,T , there exists a unique couple (u∗, v∗) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that α(v∗) = u∗, β(u∗) = v∗.
Consequently,
α(v0 ⊕ v˜1) = α0(v0)⊕ α1(v˜1) = u0 ⊕ u˜1, β(u0 ⊕ u˜1) = v0 ⊕ β1(u˜1) = v0 ⊕ v˜1.
From the uniqueness of (u∗, v∗) it follows that u˜1 = u∗|[τ,T ], v˜1 = v∗|[τ,T ]. Therefore,
iY τ,x,α1,β1τ =
iY τ,x,u˜
1,u˜1
τ =
iY τ,x,u
∗,v∗
τ =
iY τ,x,α,βτ .
For α ∈ At,T ,
esssupα1∈Aτ,T essinfβ1∈Bτ,T
iY τ,x,α1,β1τ ≥ essinfβ1∈Bτ,T iY τ,x,α1,β1τ ≥ essinfβ∈Bt,T iY τ,x,α,βτ .
The latter estimate takes into account that we associated with β1 a particular β, β(u) = v
0 ⊕
β1(u
1), u1 = u|[τ,T ], independently of α. Consequently,
esssupα1∈Aτ,T essinfβ1∈Bτ,T
iY τ,x,α1,β1τ ≥ esssupα∈At,T essinfβ∈Bt,T iY τ,x,α,βτ .
Step 2: For all ε > 0, there exists αε1 ∈ Aτ,T such that
esssupα1∈Aτ,T essinfβ1∈Bτ,T
iY τ,x,α1,β1 ≤ essinfβ1∈Bτ,T
iY τ,x,α
ε
1,β1 + ε. (6.6)
For all β ∈ Bt,T and an arbitrary fixed u0 ∈ Ut,τ , we define, for u1 ∈ Uτ,T and v ∈ Vt,T ,
β1(u
1) := β(u0 ⊕ u1)|[τ,T ], αε(v) := u0 ⊕ αε1(v1), v1 = v|[τ,T ]. (6.7)
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Then αε ∈ At,T and β1 ∈ Bτ,T .
Since αε ∈ At,T and β ∈ Bt,T , by Lemma 3.6 we have the existence of a unique couple (u∗, v∗) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T such that αε(v∗) = u∗, β(u∗) = v∗. On the other hand, from αε1 ∈ Aτ,T and β1 ∈ Bτ,T it
follows that there exists a unique couple (u˜1, v˜1) ∈ Uτ,T × Vτ,T such thatαε1(v˜1) = u˜1, β1(u˜1) = v˜1.
Since β is nonanticipative, β(u0 ⊕ u˜1)|[t,τ ] dependents only on u0 and not on u˜1. We put β0(u0) =
β(u0 ⊕ u˜1)|[t,τ ], u0 ∈ Ut,τ . Consequently, β0 ∈ Bt,τ , and
β(u0 ⊕ u˜1) = β(u0 ⊕ u˜1)|[t,τ ] ⊕ β1(u˜1) = β0(u0)⊕ β1(u˜1) = β0(u0)⊕ v˜1,
αε(β0(u
0)⊕ v˜1) = u0 ⊕ αε1(v˜1) = u0 ⊕ u˜1.
Due to the uniqueness of (u∗, v∗) we obtain v∗ = β0(u
0)⊕ v˜1, u∗ = u0 ⊕ αε1(v˜1) = u0 ⊕ u˜1. Therefore,
iY
τ,x,αε1,β1
τ =
iY τ,x,u˜
1,v˜1
τ =
iY τ,x,u
∗,v∗
τ =
iY τ,x,α
ε,β
τ ,
from which combined with (6.6) we get
esssupα1∈Aτ,T essinfβ1∈Bτ,T
iY
τ,x,α1,β1
τ ≤ essinfβ1∈Bτ,T
iY
τ,x,αε1,β1
τ + ε
≤ essinfβ∈Bt,T iY τ,x,α
ε,β
τ + ε ≤ esssupα∈At,T essinfβ∈Bt,T iY τ,x,α,βτ + ε.
For the second estimate we used that β1 in (6.7) is defined with the help of β and, thus, runs only a
subclass of Bτ,T . The above both steps allow to conclude the proof.
For a stopping time τ with values in [t, T ] we define the value functions for a game over the
stochastic interval [[τ, T ]] :
W i(τ, x) : = esssupα∈Aτ,T essinfβ∈Bτ,T
iY τ,x,α,βτ ,
U i(τ, x) : = essinfβ∈Bτ,T esssupα∈Aτ,T
iY τ,x,α,βτ .
Remark 6.7. Obviously, W i(t, x) = Wi(t, x), U i(t, x) = Ui(t, x), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, and it
can be checked in a straight-forward manner that for all discrete valued stopping times τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ T ),
i = 1, 2,
W i(τ, x) = Wi(τ, x)(:= Wi(t, x)|t=τ ),
U i(τ, x) = Ui(τ, x)(:= Ui(t, x)|t=τ ), P− a.s.
Our objective is to extend this result to general stopping times. For this end we have to extend
Proposition 3.10 and Theorem 6.1.
Similar to Proposition 3.10 we have from standard BSDEs estimates the following proposition.
Proposition 6.8. There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all stopping time τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ T ), x, x′ ∈
Rn, i = 1, 2,
|W i(τ, x)−W i(τ, x′)| ≤ C|x− x′|, |W i(τ, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|).
The same property holds for U i.
Theorem 6.9. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then the following dynamic programming
principles hold: For any stopping times τ, η with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ η ≤ T, x ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2,
W i(τ, x) = esssup
α∈Aτ,η
essinf
β∈Bτ,η
iGt,x;α,βτ,η [WNτ,iη (η,X
τ,x;α,β
η )], (6.8)
U i(τ, x) = essinf
β∈Bτ,η
esssup
α∈Aτ,η
iGt,x;α,βτ,η [UNτ,iη (η,X
τ,x;α,β
η )].
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Proof. We only comment the proof of the first relation. Let us denote by Ŵi(τ, x) the right hand side
of 6.8. We prove in a straight-forward way that W i(τ, x) = Ŵi(τ, x). For this we adapt the proof of
the Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4 in an obvious manner.
From Theorem 6.9 and Proposition 6.8 we can deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 6.10. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) be satisfied. Then, for any stopping time τ, η
with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ η ≤ T, x ∈ Rn, where η is supposed to be σ(τ)−measurable, we have the following:
|W i(τ, x) −W i(η, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)|τ − η| 12 .
Proof. We only prove that W i(τ, x)−W i(η, x) ≤ C(1 + |x|)τ − η| 12 , since the other inequality can be
proved in a similar manner. Let ε > 0. In analogy to (6.3), but now for (τ, η) instead of (t, t+ δ), we
can show that there exists some αε ∈ Aτ,η such that, for any β ∈ Bτ,η,
W i(τ, x) ≤ iGτ,x;αε,βτ,η [WNτ,iη (η,X
t,x;αε,β
η )] + ε.
Consequently, W i(τ, x)−W i(η, x) ≤ I1 + I2 + I3 + ε, where
I1 :=
iGτ,x;α
ε,β
τ,η [WNτ,iη (η,X
t,x;αε,β
η )]− iGτ,x;α
ε,β
τ,η [WNτ,iη (η, x)],
I2 :=
iGτ,x;α
ε,β
τ,η [WNτ,iη (η, x)] −
iGτ,x;α
ε,β
τ,η [W i(η, x)],
I3 :=
iGτ,x;α
ε,β
τ,η [W i(η, x)] −W i(η, x).
Thanks to Lemma 3.6, we let (u, v) ∈ Uτ,η × Vτ,η be such that αε(v) = u, β(u) = v, on [[τ, η]].
By virtue of Proposition 6.8 there exists some positive constant C which does not depend on αε
and β such that
|I1| ≤ C(E[|WNτ,iη (η,X
t,x;u,v
η )− WNτ,iη (η, x)|
2|Fτ )]) 12
≤ C(E[|Xτ,x;u,vη − x|2|Fτ )])
1
2 ≤ C(1 + |x|2)|τ − η| 12 ,
where the latter relation follows from standard SDE estimates. Let us denote by (iY, iZ, iH) the
solution of the BSDE:
−d iYs = fNt,is (s,X
t,x;u,v
s ,
iYs,
iHs,
iZs, us, vs)ds
−λ iHsds− iZsdBs − iHsdN˜s, s ∈ [τ, η],
iYη = W i(η, x).
From the definition of our backward stochastic semigroup and the σ(τ)−measurability of η it follows
that
I3 =
iGt,x;α
ε,β
τ,η [W i(η, x)] −W i(η, x)
= E[W i(η, x) +
∫ η
τ
f
N
τ,i
s
(s,Xτ,x;u,vs ,
iYs,
iHs,
iZs, us, vs)ds
−λ
∫ η
τ
iHsds−
∫ η
τ
iZsdBs −
∫ η
τ
iHsdN˜s
∣∣∣Fτ ]−W i(η, x)
= E[
∫ η
τ
f
N
τ,i
s
(s,Xτ,x;u,vs ,
iYs,
iHs,
iZs, us, vs)ds− λ
∫ η
τ
iHsds
∣∣∣Fτ ].
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Therefore, the Schwartz inequality and the Appendix of [8] yield
|I3| ≤ E[
∫ η
τ
(
|f
N
τ,i
s
(s,Xτ,x;u,vs ,
iYs,
iHs,
iZs, us, vs)|+ λ| iHs|
)
ds
∣∣∣Fτ ]
≤ |τ − η| 12E[
∫ η
τ
(
|f
N
t,i
s
(s,Xt,x;u,vs ,
iYs,
iHs,
iZs, us, vs)|+ λ| iHs|
)2
ds
∣∣∣Fτ ] 12
≤ C|τ − η| 12E[
∫ η
τ
(
|f
N
τ,i
s
(s,Xτ,x;u,vs , 0, 0, 0, us, vs)|2 + | iYs|2 + | iHs|2 + | iZs|2
)
ds
∣∣∣Fτ ] 12
≤ C|τ − η| 12E[
∫ η
τ
(
1 + |Xτ,x;u,vs |2 + | iYs|2 + | iHs|2 + | iZs|2
)
ds
∣∣∣Fτ ] 12
≤ C(1 + |x|)|τ − η| 12 .
Finally, let us give the estimate of I2. From Lemma 2.3 we have
|I2| ≤ CE[|WNτ,iη (η, x) −W i(η, x)||Fτ ] = CE[|WNτ,iη (η, x) −W i(η, x)|1{Nτ,iη 6=i}|Fτ ]
≤ C(1 + |x|)E[1
{Nτ,iη 6=i}
|Fτ ] = C(1 + |x|)P[{N τ,iη 6= i}|Fτ ]
≤ C(1 + |x|)(1 − exp(−λ(η − τ))) ≤ C(1 + |x|)|τ − η|.
Consequently, from the above inequalities we deduce that
W i(τ, x)−W i(η, x) ≤ C(1 + |x|)|τ − η|
1
2 + ε, ε > 0,
from where we conclude
W i(τ, x) −W i(η, x) ≤ C(1 + |x|)|τ − η| 12 .
The desired result then follows.
Proposition 6.11. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), the following holds: W i(τ, x) =Wi(τ, x), i.e.,
Wi(τ, x) = esssupα∈Aτ,T essinfβ∈Bτ,T
iY τ,x,α,βτ ,
for all stopping time τ with values in [t, T ].
Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ] be such that t ≤ τ ≤ T. Let us define, for i = 1, · · · , 2n,
ti =
i(T − t)
2n
+ t, Ai =
{
ti−1 < τ ≤ ti
}
, and A0 = {τ = t}, τn =
2n∑
i=0
ti1Ai .
Obviously, 0 ≤ τn− τ ≤ 1
2n
, and from the definition of Wi as well as that of the essential infimun and
supremun of a family of random variables we deduce
Wi(τn, x)(:= Wi(s, x)|s=τn) = esssupα∈At,T essinfβ∈Bt,T iY τn,x,α,βτn .
Therefore, Wi(τn, x) = W i(τn, x), P − a.s. Since τ ≤ τn ≤ T , and τn is σ(τ)−measurable, it follows
from the Propositions 6.5 and 6.10 that
|W i(τ, x)−W i(τn, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)|τ − τn|
1
2 → 0, as n→∞,
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and
|Wi(τ, x)−Wi(τn, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)|τ − τn| 12 → 0, as n→∞,
from where we conclude that also Wi(τ, x) =W i(τ, x). Therefore,
Wi(τ, x) = esssupα∈Aτ,T essinfβ∈Bτ,T
iY τ,x,α,βτ .
The proof is complete.
From the above proposition and Proposition 6.10 we immediately have:
Proposition 6.12. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), there is some positive constant C such
that, for any stopping times τ, η with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ η ≤ T, x ∈ Rn, where η is supposed to be
σ(τ)−measurable, we have the following:
|Wi(τ, x) −Wi(η, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)|τ − η|
1
2 .
Theorem 3.11 follows from Proposition 6.11 and Theorem 6.9. We also have the following
statement, which is a direct consequence of Proposition 6.11.
Proposition 6.13. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), the following holds:
W
N
t,i
τ
(τ, x) = esssupα∈Aτ,T essinfβ∈Bτ,T
N
t,i
τ Y τ,x,α,βτ .
6.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. We only give the proof for U = (U1, U2), that for W = (W1,W2) uses a similar argument. Let
i = 1, 2 be arbitrarily fixed, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn, and δ > 0. We put τ δ = inf{s ≥ t,N t,is 6= i} ∧ (t+ δ).
For ϕ ∈ C3l,b([0, T ]× Rn), we define
F (s, x, y, h, z, u, v) =
∂
∂s
ϕ(s, x) +
1
2
tr(σσT (s, x, u, v)D2ϕ(s, x)) +Dϕ(s, x)b(s, x, u, v)
+fi(s, x, y + ϕ(s, x), h + Um(i+1)(s, x)− ϕ(s, x), z +Dϕ(s, x).σ(s, x, u, v), u, v),
where (s, x, y, h, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × R× R× Rd × U × V.
Let us consider the following BSDE on the interval [t, τ δ ] :
−dY 1,u,vs = F (s,Xt,x;u,vs , Y 1,u,vs ,H1,u,vs , Z1,u,vs , us, vs)ds − λH1,u,vs ds
−Z1,u,vs dBs −H1,u,vs dN˜s,
Y
1,u,v
τδ
= 0, s ∈ [t, τ δ],
(6.9)
where Xt,x;u,v is the solution of (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ Rn.
We notice that F (s, x, y, h, z, u, v) is Lipschitz in (y, h, z), uniformly in (s, x, u, v), and there
exists a positive constant C such that
|F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v)| ≤ C(1 + |x|2), (s, x, u, v) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × U × V.
Consequently, BSDE (6.9) has a unique solution (Y 1,u,v,H1,u,v, Z1,u,v). This solution obviously de-
pends on δ, but for the sake of simplifying the notations we don’t add δ as superscript to (Y 1,u,v,H1,u,v, Z1,u,v).
For the proof of Theorem 4.2, which extends the approaches in [5] and [7] to SDGs with jumps,
we admit the following lemmas for the moment, they will be proven after.
39
Lemma 6.14. For every s ∈ [t, τ δ], the following holds:
Y
1,u,v
s∧τδ
= iGt,x;u,v
s∧τδ,τδ
[
ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
]
− Y s∧τδ ,
where
Y s = ϕ(s,X
t,x;u,v
s ) +
∫ s
t
(
Um(i+1)(r,X
t,x;u,v
r )− ϕ(r,Xt,x;u,vr )
)
dNr.
In particular,
Y
1,u,v
t =
iG
t,x;u,v
t,τδ
[
ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
]
− ϕ(t, x).
(Recall that m(j) = 1, if j is odd, and m(j) = 2, if j is even.)
We also consider the following BSDE where, in equation (6.9), Xt,x;u,v is substituted by its
deterministic initial value x:
−dY 2,u,vs = F (s, x, Y 2,u,vs ,H2,u,vs , Z2,u,vs , us, vs)ds− λH2,u,vs ds
−Z2,u,vs dBs −H2,u,vs dN˜s,
Y
2,u,v
τδ
= 0, s ∈ [t, τ δ].
(6.10)
Then we have the following comparison between Y 1,u,v and Y 2,u,v.
Lemma 6.15. For every δ ∈ (0, 1) and u ∈ Ut,t+δ , v ∈ Vt,t+δ,
|Y 1,u,vt − Y 2,u,vt | ≤ Cδ
3
2 , P− a.s.,
where the constant C does not depend on the control processes u and v, neither on δ > 0.
Moreover, we have
Lemma 6.16. For every u ∈ Ut,t+δ , v ∈ Vt,t+δ, we have
E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Y 2,u,vs |ds|Ft] + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Z2,u,vs |ds|Ft] + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|H2,u,vs |ds|Ft] ≤ Cδ
3
2 , P− a.s.,
where the constant C is independent of t, δ as well as of the control processes u, v.
Let us prove that U = (U1, U2) is a viscosity solution of the system (4.1). We begin with showing that
a) U = (U1, U2) is a viscosity subsolution of the system (4.1).
Let i = 1, 2 be arbitrarily fixed, and we suppose that Ui ≤ ϕ and Ui(t, x) = ϕ(t, x). We claim that
inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
F (t, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v) ≥ 0.
Observe that, this claim just means that U = (U1, U2) satisfies (4.3) of Definition 4.1; we will come
back to this point. We make the proof by contradiction, and suppose that the above claim is not true.
Then, thanks to the continuity of F , there exist some θ > 0, v∗ ∈ V and 0 < δ′ ≤ T − t such that
sup
u∈U
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v∗) ≤ −θ < 0, (6.11)
for all s ∈ [t, t+ δ′]. Since Ui ≤ ϕ and Ui(t, x) = ϕ(t, x), we have
ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
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≥ Ui(τ δ,Xt,x;α,βτδ )1Nt,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
= U
N
t,i
τδ
(τ δ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
).
From the Lemmas 2.2 and 6.14 it follows that
Y
1,α,β
t =
iG
t,x;α,β
t,τδ
[
ϕ(τ δ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
]
− ϕ(t, x)
≥ iGt,x;α,β
t,τδ
[U
N
t,i
τδ
(τ δ ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
)]− ϕ(t, x).
On the other hand, by virtue of Theorem 3.11 we have
essinf
β∈B
t,τδ
esssup
u∈U
t,τδ
iG
t,x;α,β
t,τδ
[U
N
t,i
τδ
(τ δ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
)]− ϕ(t, x) = Ui(t, x)− ϕ(t, x) = 0.
Therefore, essinfβ∈B
t,τδ
esssupα∈A
t,τδ
Y
1,α,β
t ≥ 0. Putting β∗(u) = v∗ on [t, τ δ ] × Ut,τδ , we have β∗ ∈
Bt,τδ . From Lemma 6.15 it follows that
0 ≤ essinf
β∈B
t,τδ
esssup
α∈A
t,τδ
Y
1,α,β
t ≤ esssup
α∈A
t,τδ
Y
1,α,β∗
t
≤ esssup
α∈A
t,τδ
Y
2,α,β∗
t + Cδ
3
2 = esssup
α∈A
t,τδ
Y
2,α(v∗),v∗
t + Cδ
3
2
≤ esssup
u∈U
t,τδ
Y
2,u,v∗
t + Cδ
3
2 .
Here we have used that Y 2,α,β
∗
t = Y
2,α(v∗),v∗
t , since β
∗(α(v∗)) = v∗. Furthermore, for all δ > 0, ε > 0,
there exists uε ∈ Ut,τδ such that
Y
2,uε,v∗
t ≥ esssup
u∈U
t,τδ
Y
2,u,v∗
t − εδ.
The two above inequalities yield
Y
2,uε,v∗
t ≥ −Cδ
3
2 − εδ. (6.12)
Since
Y
2,uε,v∗
t = E[
∫ τδ
t
F (s, x, Y 2,u
ε,v∗
s ,H
2,uε,v∗
s , Z
2,uε,v∗
s , u
ε
s, v
∗
s)ds
∣∣∣Ft],
we can deduce from the Lipschitz property of F in (y, h, z) that
Y
2,uε,v∗
t = E[
∫ τδ
t
(
F (s, x, Y 2,u
ε,v∗
s ,H
2,uε,v∗
s , Z
2,uε,v∗
s , u
ε
s, v
∗
s)− λH2,u
ε,v∗
s
)
ds
∣∣∣Ft]
≤ E[
∫ τδ
t
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, uεs , v
∗
s)ds
∣∣∣Ft]
+CE[
∫ τδ
t
(
|Y 2,uε,v∗s |+ |H2,u
ε,v∗
s |+ |Z2,u
ε,v∗
s |
)
ds
∣∣∣Ft]. (6.13)
We notice that
E[t+ δ − τ δ|Ft] ≤ δE[1t+δ>τδ |Ft] = δP[t+ δ > τ δ|Ft]
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= δ(1− exp(−λδ)) ≤ λδ2.
Choosing δ < δ′ we obtain from (6.11)
E[
∫ τδ
t
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, uεs, v
∗
s )ds|Ft] ≤ −θE[τ δ − t|Ft]
≤ θ(E[t+ δ − τ δ|Ft]− δ) ≤ θ(λδ2 − δ).
This together with (6.12), (6.13) and Lemma 6.16 yields −Cδ 32−εδ ≤ λδ2θ−θδ. Therefore, −Cδ 12−ε ≤
λδθ − θ. Letting δ ↓ 0, and ε ↓ 0 we deduce that θ ≤ 0, which is in contradiction with θ > 0.
Consequently,
inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
F (t, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v) ≥ 0.
Finally, taking into account the definition of F , we see that
inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
F (t, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v) =
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x) + inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)D2ϕ(t, x)) +Dϕ(t, x)b(t, x, u, v)
+fi(t, x, ϕ(t, x), Um(i+1)(t, x)− ϕ(t, x),Dϕ(t, x)σ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
=
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x) + inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)D2ϕ(t, x)) +Dϕ(t, x)b(t, x, u, v)
+f˜i(t, x, U1(t, x), U2(t, x),Dϕ(t, x)σ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
,
from where it follows that U = (U1, U2) is a viscosity subsolution of the system (4.1).
b) Let us show that U = (U1, U2) is also a viscosity supersolution of the system (4.1).
Let i = 1, 2 be arbitrarily fixed, and we suppose that the test function ϕ is such that Ui ≥ ϕ and
Ui(t, x) = ϕ(t, x). Then
ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
≤ Ui(τ δ,Xt,x;α,βτδ )1Nt,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
= U
N
t,i
τδ
(τ δ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
),
and thanks to Lemma 6.14 we have
Y
1,α,β
t =
iG
t,x;α,β
t,τδ
[ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;α,β
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
]− ϕ(t, x)
≤ iGt,x;α,β
t,τδ
[U
N
t,i
τδ
(τ δ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
)]− ϕ(t, x).
Consequently, from Theorem 3.11
essinf
β∈B
t,τδ
esssup
u∈U
t,τδ
iG
t,x;α,β
t,τδ
[U
N
t,i
τδ
(τ δ,Xt,x;α,β
τδ
)]− ϕ(t, x) = 0,
we obtain that essinfβ∈B
t,τδ
esssupα∈A
t,τδ
Y
1,α,β
t ≤ 0. Then, from Lemma 6.15 it follows that
essinf
β∈B
t,τδ
esssup
α∈A
t,τδ
Y
2,α,β
t ≤ Cδ
3
2 .
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Hence, there exists β∗ ∈ Bt,τδ (depending on δ) such that
esssup
α∈A
t,τδ
Y
2,α,β∗
t ≤ 2Cδ
3
2 . (6.14)
From β∗ ∈ Bt,τδ it follows that there exists an increasing sequence of stopping times {Sn(u)}n≥1,
for all u ∈ Ut,τδ , with t = S0(u) ≤ S1(u) ≤ · · · ≤ Sn(u) ≤ · · · ≤ τ δ and
⋃
n≥1{Sn(u) = τ δ} = Ω, P-a.s.,
such that, for all n ≥ 1 and u, u′ ∈ Ut,τδ with u = u′ on [[t, Sn−1(u)]], it holds
Sl(u) = Sl(u
′), 1 ≤ l ≤ n, and β∗(u) = β∗(u′), on [[t, Sn(u)]].
Therefore, S1 as well as v
∗ := β∗(u) on [[t, S1(u)]] do not dependent on the choice of u ∈ Ut,τδ . Let us
define u∗ on [[t, S1(u)]] as the process such that u
∗
·∧S1
∈ Ut,τδ and
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u∗s , v
∗
s ) = sup
u∈U
t,τδ
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v∗s ), s ∈ [t, S1(u∗)].
Putting v∗ := β∗(u∗·∧S1) on ]]S1(u
∗), S2(u
∗)]] (Observe that S2(u
∗) only dependents on u∗·∧S1),
let us define the process u∗ on [[t, S2(u
∗)]] by u∗(·∧S2(u∗))∨S1(u∗) ∈ Ut,τδ such that
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u∗s , v
∗
s) = sup
u∈U
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v∗s ), s ∈ [S1(u∗), S2(u∗)].
Therefore,
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u∗s , β
∗(u∗·∧S2(u∗))s) = sup
u∈U
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v∗s ), s ∈ [t, S2(u∗)].
Iterating the above argument we obtain u∗ on [[t, S∞[[, S∞ := limn→∞ ↑ Sn(u∗) ≤ τ δ. Choosing an
arbitrary u0 ∈ U , we define u∗ := u∗1[t,S∞[ + u01[S∞,τδ] ∈ Ut,τδ . Since
⋃
n≥1{Sn(u∗) = τ δ} = Ω we can
conclude
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u∗s , β
∗(u∗·∧Sn(u∗))s) = sup
u∈U
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v∗s )
≥ inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v), s ∈ [t, Sn(u∗)].
for all n ≥ 1, and hence, that
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u∗s , β
∗(u∗)s) ≥ inf
v∈U
sup
u∈U
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v), s ∈ [t, τ δ]. (6.15)
On the other hand, defining α∗(v) = u∗ on [t, τ δ]× Ut,τδ , we deduce from (6.14)
2Cδ
3
2 ≥ Y 2,α∗,β∗t = Y 2,u
∗,β∗(u∗)
t . (6.16)
Let us consider the following BSDEs:
−dY 2,u∗,β∗(u∗)s = F (s, x, Y 2,u
∗,β∗(u∗)
s ,H
2,u∗,β∗(u∗)
s , Z
2,u∗,β∗(u∗)
s , u
∗
s, β
∗(u∗s))ds
−λH2,u∗,β∗(u∗)s ds − Z2,u
∗,β∗(u∗)
s dBs −H2,u
∗,β∗(u∗)
s dN˜s,
Y
2,u,v
τδ
= 0, s ∈ [t, τ δ ],
and
−dY δs = 1[t,τδ](s)
(
infv∈U supu∈U F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v) − L|Y δs | − L|Zδs | − (L+ λ)Hδs
)
ds
−ZδsdBs −HδsdN˜s,
Y δt+δ = 0, s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
(6.17)
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where we denote by L the Lipschitz constant of F (s, x, y, 0, 0, u, v) with respect to y. Thanks to
Lemma 2.2 and (6.15) we conclude Y
2,u∗,β∗(u∗)
t ≥ Y δt .
We also consider the following equation:{
−dY¯ δs =
(
infv∈U supu∈U F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v) − L|Y δs |
)
ds,
Y δt+δ = 0, s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
(6.18)
Then we get the following lemma.
Lemma 6.17. For every δ ∈ (0, 1),
|Y δt − Y¯ δt | ≤ Cδ
3
2 , P− a.s.,
where the constant C does not depend on δ > 0.
From the above lemma, (6.16) and (6.17) it follows that
Cδ
1
2 ≥ 1
δ
Y¯ δt → inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
F (t, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v)
as δ → 0. Therefore, infv∈V supu∈U F (t, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v) ≤ 0. From the definition of F it now follows
that U = (U1, U2) is a viscosity supersolution of the system (4.1). We conclude the proof.
Let us give the proof of the Lemmas 6.14, 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17, which is an adaption of those in
[16] or [8] to our framework of games of the type ”NAD strategy against NAD strategy”. We begin
with the
Proof of Lemma 6.14 We notice that iGt,x;u,v
s∧τδ ,τδ
[ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+Um(i+1)(τ
δ ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
]
is defined by the following BSDE:
−d iŶ t,x;u,vs = fi(s,Xt,x;u,vs , iŶ t,x;u,vs , iĤt,x;u,vs , iẐt,x;u,vs , us, vs)ds
−λ iĤt,x;u,vs ds− iẐt,x;u,vs dBs − iĤt,x;u,vs dN˜s, s ∈ [t, τ δ ],
iŶ
t,x;u,v
τδ
= ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
,
(6.19)
through the following relation:
iG
t,x;u,v
s∧τδ ,τδ
[ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
] = iŶ t,x;u,vs , s ∈ [t, τ δ ].
On the other hand, by applying Itoˆ’s formula to Y s (see the definition of Y in Lemma 6.14), we obtain
dY s =
∂ϕ
∂s
(s,Xt,x;u,vs )ds + (∇xϕb)(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)ds+ (∇xϕσ)(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)dBs
+
1
2
tr(∂xxϕσσ
∗)(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)ds+ (Um(i+1)(s,X
t,x;u,v
s )− ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs ))dNs. (6.20)
From the definition of τ δ we have
Y τδ = ϕ(τ
δ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
) +
∫ τδ
t
(Um(i+1)(r,X
t,x;u,v
r )− ϕ(r,Xt,x;u,vr ))dNr
= ϕ(τ δ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
) + (Um(i+1)(τ
δ ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)− ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
))∆Nτδ
= ϕ(τ δ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
) + (Um(i+1)(τ
δ ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)− ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
))1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
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= ϕ(τ δ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
,
and thus Y τδ =
iŶ
t,x,u,v
τδ
. Therefore, from the above equality, (6.19) and (6.20), and the uniqueness
of the solution of BSDE (6.9), it follows that
Y
1,u,v
s∧τδ
= iGt,x;u,v
s∧τδ,τδ
[ϕ(τ δ ,Xt,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=i
+ Um(i+1)(τ
δ,X
t,x;u,v
τδ
)1
N
t,i
τδ
=m(i+1)
]− Y s∧τδ ,
and this allows to conclude the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 6.15 From (3.2) it follows that, for all p ≥ 2, there exists some positive constant
C = Cp such that
E[ sup
t≤s≤t+δ
|Xt,x;u,vs − x|p|Ft] ≤ Cδ(1 + |x|p), P− a.s.,
uniformly in u ∈ Ut,t+δ, v ∈ Vt,t+δ. Let
ϕ(s) = F (s, x, Y 2,u,vs ,H
2,u,v
s , Z
2,u,v
s , us, vs)− F (s,Xt,x,u,vs , Y 2,u,vs ,H2,u,vs , Z2,u,vs , us, vs).
Then, we have
|ϕ(s)| ≤ C(1 + |x|2)(|Xt,x;u,vs − x|+ |Xt,x;u,vs − x|3),
for s ∈ [t, t+ δ], (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn, u ∈ Ut,t+δ , v ∈ Vt,t+δ. From Lemma 2.3 it follows that
E[
∫ t+δ
t
(|Y 1,u,vs − Y 2,u,vs |2 + |Z1,u,vs − Z2,u,vs |2)ds|Ft] + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|H1,u,vs −H2,u,vs |2ds|Ft]
≤ CE[
∫ t+δ
t
ρ2(|Xt,x,u,vs − x|)ds|Ft]
≤ CδE[ sup
t≤s≤t+δ
ρ2(|Xt,x,u,vs − x|)|Ft] ≤ Cδ2,
where ρ(r) = (1 + |x|2)(r + r3), r ≥ 0. Therefore, we have
|Y 1,u,vt − Y 2,u,vt | = |E[(Y 1,u,vt − Y 2,u,vt )|Ft]|
= |E[
∫ t+δ
t
(
F (s,Xt,x,u,vs , Y
1,u,v
s ,H
1,u,v
s , Z
1,u,v
s , us, vs)
−F (s, x, Y 2,u,vs ,H2,u,vs , Z2,u,vs , us, vs)− λH1,u,vs + λH2,u,vs
)
ds
∣∣∣Ft]|
≤ CE[
∫ t+δ
t
(ρ(|Xt,x,u,vs − x|) + |Y 1,u,vs − Y 2,u,vs |+ |Z1,u,vs − Z2,u,vs |)ds|Ft]
+CE[
∫ t+δ
t
|H1,u,vs −H2,u,vs |ds|Ft]
≤ CE[
∫ t+δ
t
ρ(|Xt,x,u,vs − x|)ds|Ft] + Cδ
1
2 {E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Y 1,u,vs − Y 2,u,vs |2ds|Ft]
1
2
+E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Z1,u,vs − Z2,u,vs |2ds|Ft]
1
2 + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|H1,u,vs −H2,u,vs |2ds|Ft]
1
2}
≤ Cδ 32 .
The desired result then follows. 
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Proof of Lemma 6.16: Since F (s, x, ·, ·, ·, u, v) has a linear growth in (y, h, z), uniformly in (s, x, u, v),
there exists a positive constant C independent of δ, u and v, such that, for s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
|Y 2,u,vs |2 ≤ Cδ, E[
∫ t+δ
s
|Z2,u,vr |2dr|Fs] ≤ Cδ, E[
∫ t+δ
s
|H2,u,vr |2dr|Fs] ≤ Cδ.
By virtue of equation (6.10) we have, for s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
|Y 2,u,vs | ≤ E[
∫ t+δ
s
(
|F (r, x, Y 2,u,vr ,H2,u,vr , Z2,u,vr , ur, vr)|+ λ|H2,u,vr |
)
dr|Fs]
≤ CE[
∫ t+δ
s
(
1 + |x|2 + |Y 2,u,vr |+ |H2,u,vr |+ |Z2,u,vr |
)
dr|Fs]
≤ Cδ + C
√
δ(E[
∫ t+δ
s
|Z2,u,vr |2dr|Fs])
1
2 + C
√
δ(E[
∫ t+δ
s
|H2,u,vr |2dr|Fs])
1
2
≤ Cδ, P-a.s.
By applying Itoˆ formula to |Y 2,u,vs |2 we conclude
E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Z2,u,vs |2ds|Ft] + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|H2,u,vs |2ds|Ft] ≤ Cδ2, P-a.s.
Therefore,
E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Y 2,u,vs |ds|Ft] + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Z2,u,vs |ds|Ft] + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|H2,u,vs |ds|Ft]
≤ Cδ2 + δ 12{E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Z2,u,vs |2ds|Ft]}
1
2 + Cδ
1
2{E[
∫ t+δ
t
|H2,u,vs |2ds|Ft]}
1
2
≤ Cδ 32 , P-a.s.
The proof is complete. 
Proof of Lemma 6.17: By using standard arguments of BSDEs we get the following estimate
E[ sup
s∈[t,t+δ]
|Y δs − Y¯ δs |2|Ft] + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Zδs |2ds|Ft] + E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Hδs |2ds|Ft] ≤ Cδ2, P− a.s.
From equations (6.17) and (6.18) it follows that
|Y δt − Y¯ δt | ≤ CE[
∫ τδ
t
(
|Y δs − Y¯ δs |+ |Zδs |+ |Hδs |
)
ds|Ft]
+E[
∫ t+δ
τδ
(
inf
v∈U
sup
u∈U
F (s, x, 0, 0, 0, u, v) + L|Y δs |
)
ds|Ft]
≤ Cδ 12E[ sup
s∈[t,t+δ]
|Y δs − Y¯ δs |2|Ft]
1
2 + Cδ
1
2E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Zδs |2ds|Ft]
1
2
+Cδ
1
2E[
∫ t+δ
t
|Hδs |2ds|Ft]
1
2 + E[t+ δ − τ δ|Ft]
≤ Cδ 32 , P-a.s.
The proof is complete. 
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